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This dissertation describes an investigation into the feasibility of expressing
and enforcing use-based privacy, which posits that privacy can be provided by
preventing harmful uses of sensitive information. Use-based privacy is shown to
benefit from a reactive policy language—one that specifies not only a current set
of restrictions but also describes how those restrictions change. An instantiation
of such a reactive language, the Avenance language, is defined; its expressiveness
is demonstrated with real-world policies. The dissertation also explores the fea-
sibility of a technical means for enforcing compliance. Systems are described for
facilitating policy compliance by benign principals and architectures for enforc-
ing policy compliance in the presence of adversarial principals. A policy provider
that associates use-based privacy policies with sensitive values as policy tags also
is described. The described work collectively constitutes strong evidence for the
feasibility of use-based privacy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Current approaches to privacy in networked information systems are poorly
suited to modern networked information systems, where information is collected
without user awareness, and data sharing and analysis are pervasive. This dis-
sertation explores the feasibility of an alternate view, sometimes called use-based
privacy [14, 15, 46], which equates privacy with preventing harmful uses.
Instead of requiring informed consent from data subjects, use-based privacy
assumes there has been a societal evaluation that has identified harmful uses. This
evaluation presumably will have balanced potential harms and potential benefits of
information use—and evaluated the countermeasures in place to prevent potential
harms—to determine which uses should be deemed harmful. A system that avoids
harmful uses is then considered privacy-compliant.
Use-based privacy differs from most previous views of privacy in three key ways:
• Use-based privacy policies do not depend on the individual preferences of the
data subject but instead focus on the collective.
• Use-based privacy policies describe how information may be used rather than
limiting access or transmission.
• Use-based privacy policies impose restrictions on how both raw data and
derived data may be used, and thereby govern information flow through a
system.
The first aspect of use-based privacy is similar to the philosophy of contex-
tual integrity [47, 48, 2], which defines privacy for personal information relative
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to an appropriate context. Whether a context is appropriate is presumed to be
determined by socially-defined informational norms, which might depend on time,
location, purpose, and/or participating principals. So contextual integrity, like
use-based privacy, moves away from user-defined policies and informed consent, fo-
cusing instead on elimination of harmful uses (as defined by informational norms).
However, contextual integrity ignores how sensitive information is used as it flows
through a networked information system and thus ignores derived data; it instead
focuses on mediating individual communications and evaluating whether each data
transmission is authorized.
In this dissertation, we investigate the feasibility of expressing and enforcing
privacy regulations and corporate privacy policies; in doing so, we assume that
such use restrictions are the result of the assumed societal evaluation balancing
harms versus benefits. As the first step of our investigation, we analyze examples
drawn from data-use contracts, existing privacy policies, and U.S. regulations to
identify key attributes of a language for specifying use-based privacy policies in
networked information systems.
We observe that reactive labels [37] are a natural way to realize the identified
attributes. A reactive label maps a sequence of operations (which describe the
derivation of the value) to a set of restrictions on how that resulting value may
be used. When use-based privacy policies are specified as reactive labels, policy
specifications can be attached to data values and these specifications will flow to
derived values as information flows through the system. Existing privacy policy
specification languages are not reactive, so we introduce a new privacy specification
language—the Avenance language—that uses reactive labels and is well-suited for
expressing use-based privacy. The argument for a reactive approach to use-based
2
privacy, the Avenance language, and our experience using the Avenance language
to describe real-world policies are described in Chapter 2.
As the next step, we explore how policy compliance might be enforced. Use-
based privacy expresses restrictions on how sensitive values may be used; adver-
saries are principals that use (potentially) sensitive values—termed service providers.
We consider three different threat models: benign service providers, accountable
service providers, and malicious service providers.
Benign service providers are presumed to have non-technical incentives to com-
ply with all relevant policies (e.g., concern for reputation or legal consequences).1
Such service providers might violate a policy due to a mistake or a programmer
error, but they are not malicious. So the goal of an enforcement mechanism here
is to facilitate policy compliance by well-intentioned, but imperfect, actors. We
describe two different systems for enforcing use-based privacy policies in this threat
model: LoNet and Tir. LoNet is a runtime system that augments files with Ave-
nance policies and enforces file-granularity policy compliance by modifying the file
system. Tir is a middleware layer that provides an inline monitoring API for au-
tomatically checking Avenance policy compliance at the granularity of individual
values. These tools are described in Chapter 3.
To ensure policy compliance in the presence of accountable or malicious service
providers, use-based privacy policies must be enforced whenever a service provider
uses a value. This can be accomplished by a monitor that implements complete
mediation, provided that monitor enforces the relevant policies. And to guarantee
that the monitor is trustworthy, we need some means for monitoring behavior by
1Since existing real-world policies, including legal regulations (e.g., HIPAA) and data use poli-
cies (e.g., Facebook’s site privacy policy) are legally-binding, assuming benign service providers
is likely to be a reasonable threat model in many cases.
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service providers.
Recent developments in trusted hardware—e.g., Intel’s Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) [19]—offer a new basis for placing trust in a monitor or other program.
Using SGX, an untrusted principal can provide a remotely-authenticatable proof
or quote which attests that some program is running or has produced a given out-
put. Chapter 4 explores how to leverage that root to enforce use-based privacy in
the presence of accountable or malicious service providers.
Our investigation into the feasibility of expressing and enforcing use-based pri-
vacy has thus far assumed that policy specifications are attached to values as
tagged values that flow through a networked information system. As a final step in
this investigation, we explore how to initially associate policy specifications with
values. Drawing on lessons from the literature on identity management systems,
Chapter 5 describes an approach that relies on a system of decentralized policy
providers to associate policies with values. We also describe the implementation
of one possible policy provider.
Widespread adoption of use-based privacy will likely require further investiga-
tion into the tradeoffs of various mechanisms for expressing and enforcing use-based
privacy in real systems. Nonetheless, the described work collectively constitutes
strong evidence for the feasibility of use-based privacy, and we view this work a
promising step towards developing a privacy-enhancing, use-based privacy ecosys-
tem for the modern world.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPRESSING USE-BASED PRIVACY
We begin by discussing in Section 2.1 why observing that a reactive language
is well-suited for use-based privacy. This observation is supported by two indepen-
dent pieces of evidence: Drawing on examples from data-use contracts, existing
privacy policies, and U.S. regulations, we identify four attributes inherent to use-
based privacy—a use-based privacy specification language must be data-centric, it
must be provenance-dependent1 it must admit both permissions and obligations,
and it must include both sticky and local restrictions. All are fulfilled by a reactive
language. Independently, a user study performed on Mechanical Turk shows that
collective user preferences are in fact well-matched to a reactive policy specification
language.
In Section 2.2, we suggest a reactive privacy specification language—the Ave-
nance language—that is well-suited for expressing use-based privacy. Avenance
policies give restrictions in terms of who is using the data, the type of use (i.e.,
which operation accesses the data), and the purpose of that use. The manner in
which an Avenance policy’s current authorizations change is encoded as a privacy
automaton, a finite state automata inspired by RIF automata [37].
We evaluated the Avenance language by using it to specify real-world privacy
policies. We encoded the full set of privacy requirements defined by a pair of repre-
sentative example policies—the Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) [32] and Facebook’s site privacy policy [25]—as Avenance policies.
1Provenance-dependent policies that always increase permissions are sometimes called down-
grading policies [17, 40].
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That experience is discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 The Argument for a Reactive Language
Examples from data-use contracts, existing privacy policies, and U.S. regulations
led us to identify four key attributes of a language for specifying use-based privacy
policies:
Data-centric: A use-based privacy language must be able to as-
sociate policies with data. Since societal determinations about harmful
uses are independent of individual preferences, use-based privacy policies are
better coupled to the type of data than to the data subject. For example, a
corporate privacy policy that states, “Click history may be used to personal-
ize content” is a policy that applies to all click histories and does not depend
on data subject preferences. Some use-based privacy policies do include au-
thorizations that depend on user actions or user preferences settings. For
example, HIPAA authorizes health care providers to share directory infor-
mation with clergy members unless the data subject objects. Such policies
can be expressed if a policy specification (associated with a value) is allowed
to depend on system state.
Provenance-Dependence: A use-based privacy language must sup-
port provenance-dependent policies. During program execution, in-
formation flows from values to derived values. A use-based privacy regime
must associate policies with those derived values. For example, social norms
might preclude ads targeted according to date of birth while allowing ads to
6
depend on birthday (“Happy Birthday!”), even though birthday is derived
from date of birth. Or, legal regulations might prohibit specific details in a
health record from being used for medical research, but might allow research
using statistics derived from collections of health records. A policy might
state that contact information may be shared with third parties only after
opt-in authorization is received from the data subject. Or advertising might
be allowed based on a single HTTP request (i.e., re-marketing) but might
be prohibited based on values derived from the entire browsing history (i.e.,
targeted advertising). We conclude that policies are best defined as sets of
restrictions that depend on the sequence of operations by which the current
value was derived, and these provenance-dependent authorizations must be
propagated from initial values to derived values.
Restriction Type: A use-based privacy language must be able to
express permissions, prohibitions, and obligations. Use-based pri-
vacy policies are often expressed as permitted uses or prohibited uses, e.g.,
“email address may be used to send notifications” or “email address may not
be used to send promotional offers.” A language that expresses only permit-
ted or prohibited uses is likely to be inadequate, though, because use-based
policies might also be violated when no action is taken. For example, “Credit
card information can be shared with third parties, but remote copies must
be deleted within 90 days” requires a means to express obligations [22, 31]—
mandatory uses that must occur before a certain amount of time passes.
Policy Scope: A use-based privacy language must be able to ex-
press both sticky policies and local policies. Many use restrictions
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are broadly applicable. For example, the policy “Date of birth may not be
used to target ads” is probably not restricted to particular companies or ju-
risdictions. So a use-based privacy language must be able to support sticky
policies2 [45, 1]—policies that are associated with a value and that apply
to all uses of this value as it flows through the system. But in some cases,
restrictions might apply only within a specific context. For example, HIPAA
imposes data use restrictions on health care operators in the United States.
Any covered entity in the United States should associate these use-restrictions
with data they receive or generate, but these restrictions do not apply to prin-
cipals operating in other jurisdictions. So an expressive language should also
admit local policies, which do not propagate use restrictions to third parties.
All four attributes above are satisfied by a reactive policy specification language—
one that specifies not only a current set of restrictions for a value but also describes
how those restrictions change after a sequence of operations are applied to the
value. Reactive policy specifications define restrictions for a value and are there-
fore data-centric; reactive policy specifications can be associated with values as
information flow labels. Derived values are synthesized by operations applied to a
value; reactive policy specifications thus naturally express provenance-dependent
authorizations. Obligations define authorizations that change with the passage of
time; by viewing the passage of time as an operation applied to data, we can ex-
press obligations with reactive policy specifications. Finally, when reactive policy
specifications are associated with values, the authorizations they express are sticky
by default; but by viewing data transmission as an operation applied to data, we
can also express non-sticky (i.e., local) policies with reactive policy specifications.
2Note that sticky policies, unlike information flow labels, are not necessarily inherited by
derived values.
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(a) Age (b) Gender (c) Nationality
Figure 2.1: Study subject demographics
The connection between a reactive language and use-based privacy was moti-
vated by reading various extant policies. But we wanted to affirm that a reactive
language truly reflects priorities of people who use networked information systems.
Note that we were not interested in individual preferences but rather in understand-
ing societal definitions of harmful uses. So we conducted a user study in an attempt
to explore whether reactive policies accurately capture collective preferences. We
ran a study with 300 users using Amazon Mechanical Turk.3 Respondents were
limited to those with at least 50 approved HITs and at least a 90% approval rate;
each respondent was rewarded with one dollar. The survey was posed as a se-
quence of multiple choice questions and a few free-form questions. There were
three attention questions, one in each section of the survey4; responses that failed
the attention questions were dropped. The study was run in three batches: a pilot
study with 100 users, a follow-up study with 100 American respondents, and a
follow-up study with 100 respondents who reside in the EU. Overall, respondents
predominantly identified as American (63%) or European (32%) and slightly over
half were male (65%). Age varied, but most subjects were working-age adults.
3Note that there are open questions regarding whether Mechanical Turk respondents are
representative of society at large. We do not resolve those questions. Nonetheless, we view the
results of this study, however imperfect, as evidence that social norms might be reactive.
4Each question asked, “Are you reading the questions and making an effort to answer them
honestly?” The answer format matched the format of the surrounding questions: multiple choice
in the first section, and free-form text in the other two sections.
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Coarsen Anonymize Aggregate Passage of Time
Yes 170 191 179 83
Maybe 50 40 48 52
No 80 69 173 165
Figure 2.2: Factors influencing user data use preferences
(a) Medical data (b) Anonymous medical data (c) Aggregate medical data
(d) Social network data (e) Anon. social network data (f) Aggr. social network data
Figure 2.3: User preferences comfort with data use
The median completion time for the full survey was 7.9 minutes. The full survey
is reproduced in Appendix A.
We first asked users whether they thought permitted uses might need to change
when various operations are applied to data: 57% thought their preferred policy
would change if their data were coarsened, 63% thought their data use preferences
would change if the data were anonymized, and 60% thought their data use pref-
erences would change if their data were aggregated with that of other users. In
addition, 45% of users thought their preference would or maybe would change with
the passage of time. These results, reproduced in Figure 2.2, reinforce a view that
reactive policies are a natural match for representing societal preferences.
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We further explored the relationship between collective user preferences and
reactive policies by surveying respondents about their comfort with various uses
of both raw data and data that had an operation applied (anonymized data or ag-
gregated data). We asked each respondent to imagine an organization that stored
and used their data (a health care provider or a social network) was defining a
new data use policy, and we queried how comfortable the respondent would be to
permit each of a set of specific proposed uses—each of which might be applied to
either raw, anonymized, or aggregated data—using a four-point Likert scale: very
uncomfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, somewhat comfortable, or very comfort-
able. The results are shown in Figure 2.3. How comfortable respondents were
with medical data being used for research purposes depended on whether or not
the use was preceded by a notification. Moreover, except for particular conditions
that were deemed broadly acceptable under any circumstances (use for providing
medical care, use for research with notification), reported comfort levels varied
significantly between raw medical data (Figure 2.3a) and medical data that had
been aggregated or anonymized (Figures 2.3b and 2.3c), also supporting our belief
that reactive policies are a natural match for expressing societal preferences. In
general, users were less comfortable with various proposed uses for social network
posts than for medical data. However, some similar trends emerged. Users were
significantly more likely to be comfortable with anonymized posts or aggregated
posts being used to provide personalized recommendations, to select adds, or to
conduct research (Figure 2.3e and Figure 2.3f vs. Figure 2.3d). Users were also
more likely to allow aggregated information derived from their posts to be pub-
lished publicly.
Overall, our survey results affirm that societal norms for harmful uses—as re-
flected by existing policies and regulations and by collective end user preferences—
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depend on the history of events (environmental events and functions applied to
data) that have occurred. This, in turn, supports the view that a reactive ap-
proach is well-suited for expressing use-based privacy.
2.2 A Reactive Language for Use-based Privacy
To further explore the feasibility of use-based privacy, we developed a language for
specifying use-based privacy policies. Avenance policies5 are predicates associated
with values that specify whether a use is prohibited or allowed after a sequence of
operations have been applied to that value. So, for example, an Avenance policy
associated with a user’s date of birth might not initially allow that value to be used
for advertising, but after the year has been deleted, might allow the resulting value
(the user’s birthday) to be used for advertising.6 Avenance policies are associated
with sensitive values to form tagged values.
Avenance policies ρ are specified as conjunctions and disjunctions of policy
rules
ρ := r | ρ ∧ ρ | ρ ∨ ρ.
A policy rule r is represented as a privacy automaton—a finite state automaton
that encodes history-dependent use-based authorizations. Formally, a policy rule
is defined as a 5-tuple
r := (transType, S, s0, T, sv)
where transType is the alphabet for transitions (i.e., the set of events in a history
that might change the current set of authorized uses for a value), S := {s0, . . . , sn}
5The term Avenance is new, but was derived from the French word avenir, meaning future or
yet to occur; the etymology is analogous to that of provenance (from provenir).
6For practical reasons, we restrict Avenance policies to uses determined solely by the party
currently holding the associated value.
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is the set of states, s0 is the initial state, T is the state-transition function
T : S × transType→ S,
and sv is the violation state. Observe that, unlike standard finite-state automata,
privacy automata do not explicitly define a set of accepting states; they instead
specify a violation state sv. A sequence of uses is policy-compliant if each use is
authorized by the current state at the time that use occurs and if it never enters
the violation state sv.
A state si in a privacy automaton defines the set of permitted uses when the
privacy automaton is in that state. This set of permitted uses is specified by con-
junctions and disjunctions of authorization triples, predicates expressed as triples
(I,E,P), where I identifies an invoking principal, E is some executable binary, and
P denotes the purpose for executing E.
s := (I,E,P) | s ∧ s | s ∨ s
I may be defined as a single principal or may be a role, E may be specified by a
binary hash or by a type drawn from a hierarchy of program labels, and P may
be drawn from a hierarchy of purpose labels. Compound components I, E or P are
constructed using unions and intersections.
I := invoker | I ∩ I | I ∪ I
E := useType | E ∩ E | E ∪ E
P := purpose | P ∩ P | P ∪ P
Semantically, an authorization triple (I,E,P) specifies a predicate that allows a use
if it is in all three component sets; a state is interpreted as a predicate defined
by conjunctions and disjunctions of authorization triples. So, in effect, we are
equating authorization triples with uses.
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Some simple policies can be expressed by authorization triples in a single-state
privacy automata:
Example 2.1. Data may be viewed by medical personnel for the purpose of pro-
viding counseling or medical care:
{(doctors ∪ nurses), view, (counseling ∪medical care)}
Example 2.2. Data may be viewed by coaches and by researchers; researchers may
use data to conduct research:
{(coach ∪ researcher, view, ∗) ∨ (researcher, ∗, research)}
Authorized uses generate events when invoked; events that trigger automata
state transitions are elements in the language transType. We consider two classes
of events: environmental events—which modify the set of permitted uses for the
associated value—and synthesis events—which generate new data values and trig-
ger automata state transitions that specify the set of permitted uses for the derived
values.
transType := eEvent ∪ sEvent
Note that the invocation of an authorized use might generate both an environmen-
tal and a synthesis event.
Environmental events are specified by the alphabet eEvent. Environmental
events might be triggered by authorized uses, for example, the event sentToRe-
motePrincipal might be triggered by programs that send a copy of the value. Envi-
ronmental events might also include temporal events—clock-triggered events that
can be expressed either absolutely (atTime(t)) or a relatively (afterTime(t))—or
user actions (e.g., a change in a user’s privacy settings). The mechanism responsi-
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ble for enforcing policy compliance is responsible for updating the state of affected
policy rules when environmental events occur.
Example 2.3. Data may be viewed by coach and players; data becomes public after
18:00.
(coach ∪ player, view, ∗)start (∗, ∗, ∗)
atTime(18:00)
Temporal events are handy for expressing obligations. To capture such obligations,
we employ a violation automata state sv. If a privacy automaton enters violation
state sv, then that policy (i.e., the obligation) has been violated.
Example 2.4. Data must be deleted within 30 days.
(∗, ∗, ∗)start sv
afterTime(30 days)
Synthesis events, drawn from the alphabet sEvent, are triggered by operations
applied to a value that generate new data values. These events induce policy
derivation rules : the policy associated with the output value of a synthesis event
is the conjunction of the policies associated with the tagged values that influence
the new value according to standard information flow rules; this includes implicit
information flows. The current state of each privacy automata (i.e., policy rule)
in the derived policy is determined by matching the synthesis event against the
transitions in each of the input automata.
So, for example, if a value (e.g., anonymous mood data) is associated with the
policy shown in Example 2.5 (below) and is then reidentified, the resulting derived
data (i.e., the reidentified mood data) may be viewed by medics for the purpose of
providing counseling. If the data used to reidentify the pseudo-anonymized mood
15
Authorization Triples: States: Policy Rules:
I := invoker | I ∩ I | I ∪ I s := (I,P,E) | s ∧ s | s ∨ s r := (transType, S, s0, T, sv)
P := purpose | P ∩ P | P ∪ P S := {s1, . . . , sn}
E := useType | E ∩ E | E ∪ E
Transition Types: Transitions: Policies:
transType := eEvent ∪ sEvent T : S × transType→ S ρ := r | ρ ∧ ρ | ρ ∨ ρ
Figure 2.4: Avenance Policy Syntax.
data (e.g., a mapping between pseudonyms and identities) was also associated with
an Avenance policy, then the resulting identified mood data would be associated
with the conjunction of two policies: one derived from the automaton associated
with each of the two inputs.
Example 2.5. Anonymous mood data may be viewed by medical personnel. Anony-
mous mood data may be re-identified and subsequently viewed by medical personnel
for the purpose of providing counseling. Derived readiness score may be used by
coaches.
(medic, view, ∗)∨
(medic, reidentify, counseling)
start
(medic, view, counseling)(coach, ∗, ∗)
reidentify
readinessCalc
The syntax for Avenance policies is summarized in Figure 2.4. Observe that
Avenance policies are constructed from sets of labels invoker, purpose, useType,
eEvent, sEvent; these sets are defined by some namespace associated with the
policy. We presume an agreed interpretation for each label—a legally-binding
definition of the programs comprising that type (e.g., a specific natural-language
explanation). Different namespaces could be defined by individual data stores,
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service providers, or established nonprofit organizations. One example namespace
is given in Example 2.6.
Example 2.6. PMSys is a mobile and web-based application developed at the Uni-
versity of Tromsø that performs physiological evaluation and training-load person-
alization for soccer players. PMSys collects data about player mood, sleep patterns,
physical fitness, and injuries. These data are subject to data-use restrictions de-
rived both from the data-use contract signed by the players (who all are members of
elite clubs and national teams in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark). The following
namespace was defined to support policies for the PMSys soccer application:
invoker := {medical, coach, player}
purpose := {prevention, diagnosis, care, intervention}
useType := {view, sendTo(·), delete, average, pseudonoymize, reidentify,
readinessCalc, rosterCalc}
eEvent := {atTime(·), afterTime(·)}
sEvent := {average, pseudonoymize, reidentify, readinessCalc, rosterCalc}
2.3 Evaluating Avenance Policy Expressiveness
Avenance policies have utility only if they are able to describe use-based privacy
policies arising in practice. We selected two real-world policies to use for evalu-
ating the expressiveness of the Avenance language. Medical care is one field that
could benefit from broader data sharing if (and perhaps only if) strong privacy
guarantees can be maintained, so we selected the United States federal regulation
on privacy for health data, the Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), as one example policy. Recent headlines, including reported uses of
Facebook data by Cambridge Analytica and other business partners, have high-
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lighted the wealth of personal data collected and shared by social networks, and
the demand for stronger privacy controls for this data. So we selected Facebook’s
site privacy policy [25] as our second example policy. We believe that each exam-
ple policy is representative of a class of data use policies (privacy regulations and
site privacy policies, respectively) that constitute common sources of use-based
policies. For each, we determined whether and how the imposed use-restrictions
might be expressed as Avenance policies. Success with these example applica-
tions increases our confidence in the broad applicability of our reactive approach
to use-based privacy.
2.3.1 HIPAA
HIPAA regulates members of the health care industry. In addition to defining
rules for information storage and security, it imposes limitations on how health
providers or covered entities may use and disclose personal health information.
To encode HIPAA’s data-use rules, we use a variant of Semantic Parameteri-
zation [8]. For each rule, we identify five properties constraining a use:
1. The object is the data to which the use restriction applies.
2. The invoker is the principal that invokes the use.
3. The purpose is the goal of the activity.
4. The action is the type of use covered by the rule.
5. The condition is a Boolean expression indicating when the rule applies.
We analyzed §164.502-§164.528 of the HIPAA Privacy Rule—the sections de-
scribing restrictions on how data may be used—and extracted 95 data-use tuples.
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We then manually analyzed each of the resulting data-use tuples, and we formalized
each tuple as an Avenance policy rule. The full encoding is given in Appendix B.
Inspecting the resulting policies, we observed that invoker, purpose, and action
defined an authorization triple (I,E,P) that could be expressed in the Avenance
language. Some data-use rules referred to a particular action (e.g., Example 2.7),
but much of HIPAA describes restrictions on use according to purpose (e.g., Ex-
ample 2.8); the Avenance language allows us to express both types of restriction.
Example 2.7. HIPAA §164.502(a)(1)(i): A covered entity is permitted to disclose
protected health information to the individual.
Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
PHI CE ∗ discloseTo(Subject)
(CE, discloseTo(Subject), ∗)start
Example 2.8. HIPAA §164.506(c)(1): A covered entity may use or disclose pro-
tected health information (PHI) for its own treatment, payment, or health care
operations.
Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
PHI CE treatment ∗
PHI CE payment ∗
PHI CE healthCare ∗
(CE, ∗, treatment)∨
(CE, ∗, payment)∨
(CE, ∗, healthCare)
start
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Some HIPAA privacy rules refer to particular classes of objects objects (e.g.,
de-identified health information); these define how data may be used after specific
transformations have occurred.
Example 2.9. HIPAA §164.502(d): (1)A covered entity may use protected health
information to create information that is not individually identifiable health infor-
mation or disclose protected health information only to a business associate for
such purpose, whether or not the de-identified information is to be used by the cov-
ered entity. (2) Health information that meets the standard and implementation
specifications for deidentification under §164.514(a) and (b) is considered not to be
individually identifiable health information, i.e., de-identified. The requirements of
this subpart do not apply to information that has been de-identified in accordance
with the applicable requirements of §164.514, provided that: (i) [...] and (ii) If
de-identified information is re-identified, a covered entity may use or disclose such
re-identified information only as permitted or required by this subpart.
Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
PHI CE ∗ deidentify
PHI CE toDeidentify discloseTo(BA)
de-identified HI ∗ ∗ ∗
(CE, deidentify, ∗)∨
(CE, discloseTo(BA), toDeidentify)
start (∗, ∗, ∗)
deidentify
reidentify
Other HIPAA rules specify conditions under which that rule applies. These
conditions would be encoded in an Avenance policy using environmental events.
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In the following example, specific information has additional permissions, but only
as long as the user (i.e., the subject of the data) is aware of the possible use
and does not object. To encode this data-use rule, we employ two environmental
events—informUser and userObjection—to specify how the authorization changes
after the data subject has been informed of the possible use and after the data
subject registers an objection to those uses.
Example 2.10. HIPAA §164.510(a)(1): Except when an objection is expressed
in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this section, a covered health care provider
may: (i) Use the following protected health information to maintain a directory
of individuals in its facility: (A) The individual’s name; (B) The individual’s
location in the covered health care provider’s facility; (C) The individual’s condition
described in general terms that does not communicate specific medical information
about the individual; and (D) The individual’s religious affiliation; and (ii) Disclose
for directory purposes such information: (A) To members of the clergy; or (B)
to other persons who ask for the individual by name. (2) Opportunity to object.
A covered health care provider must inform an individual of the protected health
information that it may include in a directory and the persons to whom it may
disclose such information (including disclosures to clergy of information regarding
religious affiliation) and provide the individual with the opportunity to restrict or
prohibit some or all of the uses or disclosures permitted by paragraph (a)(1) of this
section.
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Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
directory info CE maintainDir ∗
after informUser
unless objection
directory info CE ∗ discloseTo(clergy)
after informUser
unless objection
directory info CE ∗ discloseTo(byName)
after informUser
unless objection
(∅, ∅, ∅)start (∅, ∅, ∅)
(CE, ∗,maintainDir)∨
(CE, discloseTo(clergy), ∗)∨
(CE, discloseTo(byName), ∗)
(∅, ∅, ∅)
extractDirInfo
informUser
objection
Finally, some HIPAA privacy rules impose obligations rather than expressing
permissions. These rules are expressed in the Avenance language by using temporal
transitions. Actions that fulfill obligations are environmental events, which trigger
a state transition.
Example 2.11. HIPAA §164.524(b): (1) The covered entity must permit an in-
dividual to request access to inspect or to obtain a copy of the protected health
information about the individual that is maintained in a designated record set.
(2)(i) The covered entity must act on a request for access no later than 30 days
after receipt of the request as follows.
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Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
PHI CE response SendTo(Subject)
(∅, ∅, ∅)start (CE, sendTo(Subject), response)
VIOLATION
requestByUser
sendTo(Subject) afterTime(30 days)
Because we were able to express all 95 identified data use rules as Avenance pol-
icy rules, our experience with HIPAA confirms that types of data-use restrictions
defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule can be expressed as rules in the Avenance
policy language.
Five HIPAA data-use rules, however, illustrate what might be termed second-
order use restrictions. For example, §164.508, which deals with user authorizations
(and exceptions to the authorization requirement), includes the statement that cov-
ered entities may use protected health information for any use explicitly authorized
by the user.
Example 2.12. HIPAA §164.508(a)(1): Except as otherwise permitted or re-
quired by this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health
information without an authorization that is valid under this section. When a
covered entity obtains or receives a valid authorization for its use or disclosure of
protected health information, such use or disclosure must be consistent with such
authorization.
This privacy rule can be expressed in the Avenance language using an unin-
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terpreted label authorizedUses. However, we do not consider such a formulation to
be useful for policy enforcement. Instead, we would expect to handle second-order
rules simply by adding additional policy rules (corresponding to the authorized
uses) to the Avenance policy at the time an authorization is received.
2.3.2 Facebook Privacy Policy
For our second case study, we selected of Facebook’s Data Use Policy [25], which
states how Facebook uses information it collects. Facebook is a widely used service
provider; the terms of its data use policy are typical for social networking sites.
The ability to express Facebook’s data use policy is therefore a positive indicator
for the Avenance approach.
We performed a detailed analysis of Facebook’s data use policy. Adopting the
standard legal interpretation, we view any stated use as a permission. We employ
the same methodology as we used to analyze HIPAA: first code each sentence
of the data use policy using our five-fold attribute classification (this results in
a set of 38 data use tuples) then formulate each of these tuples as an Avenance
policy rule. An example data use rule from Facebook’s data use policy is given in
Example 2.13; the full data use policy is described in Appendix C.
Example 2.13. We are able to deliver our Services, personalize content, and
make suggestions for you by using this information to understand how you use
and interact with our Services and the people or things you’re connected to and
interested in on and off our Services.
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Object Invoker Purpose Action Condition
PI FB ∗ generateModel
user model FB deliverService ∗
user model FB personalize ∗
user model FB suggest ∗
(FB, generateModel, ∗)start
(FB, ∗, deliverService)∨
(FB, ∗, personalize)∨
(FB, ∗, suggest)
generateModel
Facebook’s data use policy describes permitted behaviors both in terms of
particular functions (e.g., generating a user model) and general purposes that
might motivate a variety of different functions (e.g., delivering services). Many
rules depend on state transitions triggered by both synthesis (e.g., user model
generation, anonymization, aggregation) and environmental events (e.g., changes
in user settings). Facebook promises to delete posts after an account is deleted,
defining an obligation. Note, however, that Facebook’s data use policy does not
contain any second-order rules. The published policy does modify the set of valid
authorizations when a user updates preference settings; however this set of settings
is a finite, pre-defined set that can be expressed by our first-order semantics.
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CHAPTER 3
ENFORCEMENT WITH BENIGN SERVICE PROVIDERS
In this chapter, we consider the problem of enforcing compliance with use-based
privacy policies for benign service providers.
Benign Service Providers. Service providers are presumed to have
non-technical incentives to comply with all relevant policies (e.g., concern
for reputation or legal consequences). They might violate a policy due to
a mistake or a programmer error, but they are not actively malicious.
Here, it suffices to provide tools that facilitate policy compliance for well-
intentioned, but imperfect, service providers. We propose to facilitate policy com-
pliance by (1) separating the policy from the code, thereby improving modularity
and extensibility and (2) introducing an automated compliance checker. With
the Avenance language, policy experts, working with a corporate legal team, can
encode relevant regulations and data-use contracts as Avenance policies. Indepen-
dently, developers can annotate application code with applicable use types. There
is no automatic verification of annotations. However, by assuming benign service
providers, we are presuming that service providers perform a manual code review
to ensure annotation correctness. The automated compliance checker then enforces
use-based privacy policies on the basis of those annotations. This enforcement can
either be prevention-based—the compliance checker blocks unauthorized uses—or
detection-based—the compliance checker creates an audit log that records all uses
of tagged values. The prevention-based approach offers improved performance, but
it is unable to prevent all policy violations; it cannot prevent violations of obli-
gations, and enforcement might be imprecise if application code is not correctly
annotated. The detection-based approach relies on post-facto auditing and deter-
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rence through accountability—such monitors have been shown to reliably detect
violations of real-world policies (e.g., HIPAA) [26].
In this chapter, we present two approaches to automatically checking policy
compliance in the presence of benign adversaries: LoNet, which modifies a file
system to implement policy enforcement at the granularity of operating system
objects (e.g., processes and files) and Tir, which provides a library for augmenting
programs with language-level inline monitoring.
3.1 LoNet
LoNet is a runtime system deployed inside a machine virtualization container (e.g.,
VirtualBox [69] or Docker [21]). It implements a reference monitor that intercepts
data accesses to ensure compliance with Avenance policies. LoNet adopts the file
system as its primary interface.1 LoNet stores all values in files, and files are
organized in hierarchical directories. Each file can be associated with a policy file
that contains an Avenance policy. LoNet intercepts system calls that read or write
files and mediates those accesses to enforce compliance with the Avenance policy
defined by the associated policy file.
3.1.1 Policy Expression
LoNet supports a simple but expressive subset of the Avenance language. A LoNet
policy file encodes the authorizations of a single state in a privacy automaton. Syn-
1Although we do not directly support databases or structured files, fine-grained policies could
be implemented by employing an appropriate file-based data model for databases or by otherwise
subdividing data into many small files.
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import errno, time, os
from fuse import FuseOSError
# setup by LoNET: path
if (time() - lstat(path).st_ctime) > 86400:
raise FuseOSError(EACCES)
Figure 3.1: The meta-code permiting access within 24 hours.
tactically, it contains contains three components: (1) a list of invokers I permitted
to use the associated data file in any way (this correspond to authorization triples
of the form (I, ∗, ∗)), (2) a mapping from executable types E to policy files speci-
fying which policy file to associate with a derived file synthesized by a program of
type E (which both induces authorization triples of the form (∗,E, ∗) and defines
automata state transitions triggered by synthesis events E), and (3) a mapping
from executable types E to code snippets or meta-code that should be run when
programs of type E are invoked. Meta-code can be used to specify automata state
transitions triggered by an environmental event eEvent. For example, to impose
an obligation that a particular file may be viewed only for the next 24 hours, the
policy could use the meta-code shown in Figure 3.1, which throws an error if the
time limit has expired.
Consider the example set of policy files is given in Figure 3.2: The policy
/pol/priv from Figure 3.2a defines a privacy automata state with authorization
(owner, ∗, ∗) ∨ (∗, download, ∗) and with state transition download 7→ /pol/raw.
If that policy file were associated with a credential file containing a user’s Fitbit
OAuth2 token, then LoNet would intercept system calls that access the credential
file and enforce that only a container run by the credential owner may invoke
a program of type view on that file (since any program run by invoker owner
may access the file, but only programs of type download may access the file when
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[permissions]
roles = {owner}
[transitions]
download=/pol/raw
(a) /pol/priv
[permissions]
roles = {medic}
[transitions]
smoothing=/pol/smoothed
desensitize=/pol/desens
[metacode]
view=/code/24hr
(b) /pol/raw
[permissions]
roles = {coach}
[transitions]
desensitize=/pol/pub
(c) /pol/smoothed
[permissions]
roles = {medic}
[transitions]
smoothing=/pol/pub
(d) /pol/desens
[permissions]
roles = {*}
(e) /pol/pub
Figure 3.2: A set of example LoNet policy files.
invoked by any other invoker). Files derived from the credential file inherit a policy
file determined by the policy file associated with the credential file and the type
of program that created them, following the policy derivation rule described in
Chapter 2. For example, if a medic (who cannot view the credential file) runs a
program with executable type download that uses the credentials file to download
raw data from the Fitbit data store (which they are authorized to do), then the
downloaded data file will be associated with the policy file /pol/raw defined in
Figure 3.2b. The policy on the downloaded data enables the medic to initially
read the output data. However, this policy specifies that the /code/24hr meta-
code should run each time view is invoked. The meta-code, shown in Figure 3.1,
compares the file creation time with the current time and returns the EACCESS
error if the difference is more than 24 hours. The Avenance privacy automata
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(∗, download, ∗)start
(medic, ∗, ∗)
(∗, smoothing, ∗)
(∗, desensitize, ∗)
(coach, ∗, ∗)
(∗, desensitize, ∗)
(medic, ∗, ∗)
(∗, smoothing, ∗)
(∗, ∗, ∗)
download
smoothing desensitize
afterTime(24 hrs)
smoothing desensitize
desensitize smoothing
Figure 3.3: A graphic depiction of the policy automaton described by the policy
files in Figure 3.2.
corresponding to this example is shown in Figure 3.3.
LoNet supports both mandatory and discretionary policies. A policy for a file
can be defined by the file’s owner at the time the file is created. Policies can also
be added subsequently, by a data processor. In addition, any newly created file
inherits policies from files on which the content of the new file depends, according
to the derivation rules defined by the Avenance language. Using LoNet, a user can
therefore safely share a file (and the associated policy) with other users; LoNet
will permit the receiver to use the file contents only in a manner authorized by the
associated Avenance policy.
3.1.2 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of LoNet using the FUSE user-level file system li-
brary (available in Linux 2.6 and Linux 3 kernels) in combination with VirtualBox
containers. The LoNet daemon process runs as a privileged system user inside the
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container; it has full access to a hidden source file-system directory. The source
directory is exported to a known mount point accessible to system processes. The
authorizations of those system processes are controlled by LoNet. The LoNet
daemon intercepts all file system calls to the visible mount point and mediates
file access, invokes meta-code execution, and invokes policy derivation routines to
enforce and propagate the security policies attached to files.
Invoker types are implemented as roles. Users acting in a role interact with
protected objects within the LoNet sandbox through traditional file system ab-
straction and tools. Authorized users (e.g., data owners and data processors) may
also associate additional policies with files using the extended file attributes feature
available in modern Linux kernels and filesystems. To associate a policy with a
file, a principal uses the setfattr command. For example, an athlete can express
the policy from Figure 3.3 with a file credentials using the command
#> setfattr -n policy -v /pol/priv credentials
LoNet reads the extended file attribute policy when mediating system calls that
access a data file and enforces the Avenance policy defined in the named policy
file.
As described in Section 3.1.1, an Avenance policy in LoNet might depend both
on the invoker type I—the role of the user that invokes the LoNet container—and
on the executable type E of the program that is invoked. To support policies that
depend on the invoker’s role, FUSE needs to inform LoNet about which principal
is accessing the file system, and in which role. Unfortunately, the FUSE interface
only provides Linux process-id, user-id, and group-id of the calling process. To
circumvent this problem, LoNet requires that user certificates are passed as part
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of the file name itself, as the first component of a Linux path name.
To support policies that depend on the executable that is invoked, LoNet de-
fines executable types E as pairs comprising an identifier for the program (either the
SHA-256 hash of program binary or a exe path value to a trusted binary location)
and an expression that restricts arguments of that program. Restrictions on argu-
ments enable LoNet to map programs expressed in scripting languages, like Python
or R, based on both the binary and the script file being loaded. Trusted programs
that correspond to a particular E are specified in a configuration file, as illustrated
in Figure 3.4. When a program attempts to access a file, LoNet maps the process-
id to the appropriate executable type by (1) reading and hashing the executable
binary for the process-id as provided through /proc/{pid}/exe; (2) reading and
parsing the program arguments as provided through /proc/{pid}/cmdline; and
(3) matching the hash of the executable and its arguments to an executable type
E as specified in the executable type configuration file. To improve performance,
LoNet maintains a cache of recently seen pids and their executable types, which
avoids some of the cost related to the mapping of process-ids to executable types.
To implement the Avenance policy derivation rule while supporting automation
tools and interactive programs—like GNU Make or bash-shells—that might invoke
multiple other sub-programs, LoNet implements sessions. Each program is run in
the context of a session, and each session is associated with a principal. Sessions
are used to implement policy propagation; each time a program accesses a data
file, the session is tainted with the policy file associated with that data file. The
policy for an output file is the conjunction of the policy files in the session taint.
By propagating taint exclusively within a session, LoNet limits over-tainting.
A program initiates a new session by reading from dedicated file /newsession—
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[cat]
exe_path = /bin/cat
useType = publish
[Analyze]
exe=e671...
options_match = -B -d -E -h -i -O -OO ...
options_havearg = -m -Q -W -c
arg0_type = hash
arg0 = 0x[...]17011
ttype=desensitize
[Download]
exe=e671...
options_match = -B -d -E -h -i -O -OO ...
options_havearg = -m -Q -W -c
arg0_type = path
arg0 = /code/download
ttype=project
Figure 3.4: Example executable type specification file.
which returns an unique 32-byte session identifier—and setting the SESSION ID
environment variable to the returned session identifier prior to the program’s first
file operation. Programs that do not explicitly specify a session identifier are
mapped to a default NULL session; programs run in the context of the default NULL
session might be associated with unnecessary meta-code.
3.1.3 Evaluation
To quantify the overhead of the policy-enforcing mechanism in LoNet, we evaluated
a set of micro-benchmarks. We ran all experiments on a Lenovo Thinkpad T430s
with an Intel Core i7-3520M CPU with four cores, each running at 2.90 GHz; 12 GB
of main memory; and a 500 GB Samsung 840 EVO SSD drive. This hardware is
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(a) Copy performance with file-
size.
(b) Copy performance with
blocksize.
(c) File aggregation perfor-
mance.
Figure 3.5: Performance results for the LoNet prototype.
representative of what our expected end-user would have available. The machine
runs 64-bit Ubuntu 13.04, and we use Anaconda Python 3.4 to run LoNet.
First, we measure how IO performance is affected by our meta-code propaga-
tion and policy transition mechanisms by measuring the time it takes a Python
script to copy data between two files within the LoNet container. The script reads
and writes using 32 kB blocks; the initial files contain random bytes. Figure 3.5a
shows the observed overhead of LoNet on files with and without meta-code policies
for file sizes ranging from 1 kB to 64 MB. For comparison, we also run the experi-
ment directly on the underlying Ext4 filesystem, and on a minimal Python-based
FUSE filesystem (Python + FUSE), which only passes invoked operations to the
underlying filesystem. Each experiment is repeated 10 times; the figure reports
the mean. As shown in Figure 3.5a, there is significant overhead associated with
LoNet.
Figure 3.5b reports how block size affects our copy experiment. We set the
file size to 64 MB and vary the block size between 64 B and 64 kB. As expected,
the increase in IO operations due to a small block size adversely impacts LoNet’s
performance.
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Finally, we evaluate how LoNet performs when aggregating a large number of
files. For this, we implement a Python script that consecutively reads and computes
the SHA-256 hash for a given set of files. Figure 3.5c shows the time it take to
aggregate between 1 and 1000 files. Each test file contains 10 MB of random data.
The block size is set to 16 kB. As shown in Figure 3.5c, computational intensive
workloads are less affected by the IO overhead of LoNet.
3.2 Tir
LoNet suffers from three weaknesses. First, policy enforcement in LoNet imposes a
significant performance cost, primarily by relying on a userspace filesystem (FUSE)
and an interpreted language (Python). Second, LoNet was designed to track and
enforce policies at the granularity of a file; fine-grained tracking and enforcement is
not supported. Third, it does not support the full Avenance language. Therefore
we designed and built a second system called Tir2 that mitigates those shortcom-
ings; Tir is a middleware layer that enforces Avenance policies at the granularity
of individual values.
3.2.1 System Design
We designed an inline monitoring library that enables application developers to
annotate regions of code that correspond to uses and to augment existing or future
applications with an inline monitor that implements automated compliance check-
ing. The library supports both prevention-based and detection-based enforcement;
2Tir is the Armenian god of learning and wisdom, who is responsible for recording men’s
actions, both good and bad.
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polstore * init polstore(char *l) Initialize a polstore with logfile name l
(may be NULL for prevention-based en-
forcement).
int store policy(polstore *s, void *v,
char *p)
Create a polstore entry in s for the value
at location v and associate it with policy
serialized as p.
int delete policy(polstore *s,
void *v)
Delete the entry associated with v from
polstore s.
pol * retrieve policy(polstore *s,
void *v)
Return the policy from s associated with
the value at location v.
int trans(polstore *s, char *i,
char *p, char *t, int n, void *ins[],
void *o)
Use the n values ins[] for use (i, p, t),
where t is a transitions type, and asso-
ciated the derived policy with the output
stored in o.
void change use(polstore *s,
char *i, char *p, char *e, int b)
If b = 0 remove, add use (i, p, e) to the
set of current uses for polstore s.
void *use(polstore *s, void *v) Use the value v for the current use(s) de-
fined in polstore s.
int check policy(polstore *s,
void *v, char *i, char *p, char *e)
Return a boolean indicating wither the
use (i, p, e) is currently permitted by the
policy associated with v.
Figure 3.6: Monitoring API for our inline monitor implementation.
the enforcement mode can be configured with a compiler flag. The API provided
by the inline monitoring library is given in Figure 3.6; the behavior of each API
call is described below.
The API call init polstore initializes the monitor and creates a policy store,
which will store tagged values; the policy store uses the memory address as an
identifier for a value and maps addresses to policies. Tagged values can subse-
quently be added or removed from the policy store using API calls store policy
and delete policy; the policy for a tagged value can be retrieved using the API call
retrieve policy. When the API call trans is invoked, the monitor automatically com-
putes policies for the derived (output) value o based on the policies of the input
values ins[] and the declared executable type E = t of the function that generates
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the derived value; it then adds the derived tagged value to the policy store. If the
library is configured for prevention-based enforcement, all API calls that modify
the policy store append a log entry to the audit log maintained by the monitor.
Code snippets that correspond to particular executable types E are labeled
using change use to mark the beginning and end of code segments that implement
a particular use. If the library is configured for prevention-based enforcement, this
API call updates the list of current executable types; if the library is configured for
detection-based enforcement, this API call appends a log entry to the audit log.
When a tagged value is used, that use should be accompanied with a monitor call
use that will enforce policy compliance. If the library is configured for prevention-
based enforcement, this monitor call replaces the tagged value with a NULL pointer
whenever the use is not authorized; authorization decisions are determined by
the current set of executable types. If the library is configured for detection-
based enforcement, this monitor call appends a log entry to the audit log for later
inspection.
The inline monitor also includes a check policy call; a policy-compliant applica-
tion that uses the inline monitor in prevention mode is expected to call check policy
immediately prior to any call to use and only proceed if the use is authorized.
3.2.2 Implementation
We implemented Tir as a C library libav with 2701 lines of code [4]. Syntactically,
Avenance policies are json encodings of lists of privacy automata; these lists are
interpreted as conjunctions of policy rules. Header file av.h defines the public
interface for Tir.
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Figure 3.7: Performance of inline monitoring library calls.
3.2.3 Evaluation
To predict the performance of an inline monitor implemented with our library, we
ran a series of microbenchmarks that evaluate the costs of various library calls.
We ran our experiments on an OptiPlex 9020 with an Intel Core i7-4790 3.6 GHz
CPU and 16GB of memory running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (kernel version 3.13.0).
The average latency of 1000 experiments is shown in Figure 3.7. Higher latency
imposed by the detection-based monitor can be attributed to the cost of writing
log entries to disk.
To evaluate the effect of automatic compliance-checking on application perfor-
mance, we ported the PMSys application from Example 2.6—which requests raw
values about players, computes the aggregate statistics, and then displays the re-
sults to the team coach—to run with inline monitoring. PMSys is implemented
as a web application with 4300 lines of HTML, 140,000 of Javascript, and 10,000
lines of CSS. To enable compatibility with our inline monitoring library, we ported
the key data analytics functionality to run in 1000 lines of C/C++. To annotate
our code for inline monitoring, we needed to add 23 calls to the monitoring API.
The effect on end-to-end latency of the application was negligible; performance of
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the monitored code was within the error margin of our baseline experiment. Tir
therefore offers significant performance improvement relative to LoNet at the cost
of introducing a burden on application developers—programmers must implement
their code with calls to the inlined monitor.
39
CHAPTER 4
ENFORCEMENT WITH ADVERSARIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
Tools like LoNet and Tir are designed to enable service providers to ensure
that they comply with all relevant use-based privacy policies. They are not, how-
ever, designed to enforce compliance if a service provider does not cooperate. An
adversarial service provider can bypass LoNet by manipulating files outside of the
LoNet filesystem or simply by not running LoNet at all. An adversarial service
provider can bypass Tir by mislabeling a use type (e.g., annotating a disallowed use
as a different permitted use) or omitting annotations when a use occurs (thereby
bypassing the policy checks). In either case, there is also no way to ensure or check
whether a particular service provider is (correctly) deploying these systems.
In this chapter, we describe our investigation of the feasibility of enforcing
Avenance policies in the presence of adversarial service providers. We consider
two possible threat models:
Accountable Service Providers. Service providers are rational prin-
cipals that act to optimize some utility function; they might knowingly
violate use-based privacy policies under certain circumstances, for exam-
ple, to increase profits. The utility function gives significant negative
weight to being detected in a policy violation, so an accountable service
provider will not run code that results in a policy violation that some au-
ditor might detect. It suffices to detect violations in order to guarantee
policy compliance by accountable service providers.
Malicious Service Providers. Service providers here might know-
ingly violate use-based privacy by running code that results in a policy
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violation—even if that violation might be detected. Such behavior must
be prevented. A monitor that implements prevention is needed to enforce
policy compliance by malicious service providers.
Accountable service providers are the appropriate threat model if service pro-
viders are subject to legal consequences or negative publicity. In other cases (e.g.,
if service providers can’t be reliably identified or if they are irrational), service
providers might not conform to the defining assumptions for accountable service
providers and should instead be considered malicious.
To ensure policy compliance in the presence of accountable or malicious service
providers, use-based privacy must be enforced whenever a service provider uses a
value. As in the benign case, this can be accomplished by either prevention or
deterrence through accountability. Both approaches involve monitoring accesses,
and both require the monitor to be trusted to enforce that policy. To guarantee that
the monitor is trustworthy when service providers are not benign, however, we need
some means for monitoring behavior by service providers. Existing approaches to
monitoring focus exclusively on read/write access control [41, 10] or on systems
under the control of a single trusted authority [53, 57] and, thus, are unsuited for
enforcing use-based privacy in distributed systems.
Recent developments in trusted hardware—e.g., Intel’s Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) [19]—offer a new basis for placing trust in a monitor or other program.
Using SGX, an untrusted principal can provide a remotely-authenticatable proof
or quote which attests that some program is running or has produced a given out-
put. In this chapter, we investigate the feasibility of using Intel’s SGX hardware
as a root of trust, and we explore how we might leverage that root to implement
41
use-based privacy. An overview of relevant SGX features is given in Section 4.1.
We explore three possible architectures for enforcing use-based privacy in dis-
tributed systems with adversarial service providers. In our source-based monitor-
ing architecture, policy providers1—trusted principals responsible for storing values
and associating values with policies—run the monitors. Applications request values
from policy providers; only those applications that provide appropriate credentials
(e.g., SGX quotes) can gain access to sensitive values. The source-based moni-
toring architecture provides strong security guarantees. It is also easily deployed;
application developers do not need to handle or interpret policies, and enforcement
is compatible with legacy applications. However, this architecture exhibits poor
performance for many applications. The architecture is described and evaluated
in Section 4.2.
The performance limitations of source-based monitoring lead us to consider an
alternative architecture called delegated monitoring, which improves throughput
and reduces latency by locating the monitor at service providers. Delegated mon-
itors act as proxies for local applications and use SGX quotes to prove to a policy
provider that they are instances of a valid monitor; local applications use SGX
to locally authenticate with the delegated monitor in order to gain access to data
that is limited by policy to particular uses. The architecture provides the same
strong security guarantees, while demonstrating significant performance improve-
ments over source-based monitoring. However, delegated monitoring is less easily
deployed than source-based monitoring, because service providers must run a dele-
gated monitor and because local applications must interact with that monitor and
store cached policies. This architecture is described in Section 4.3.
1Chapter 5 discusses the role of policy providers in our ecosystem, and describes the design
and implementation of one possible policy provider.
42
The primary shortcoming of the delegated monitoring architecture is noticeable
latency overhead for applications that handle lots of data or that enforce policy
for fine-grained data. To eliminate this overhead, we consider a final architecture,
inline monitoring, which inlines monitoring code directly into a monitored service
provider application. This final architecture offers the best performance, particu-
larly for applications that handle lots of data or fine-grained policies. However, the
architecture (like other inline monitors, e.g., Tir) imposes a burden on application
developers and, moreover, this approach is only able to guarantee policy compli-
ance in an attenuated threat model. This architecture is described in Section 4.4.
4.1 An Overview of Intel SGX
Intel’s Secure Guard Extensions (SGX) are an extension to the Intel x86 instruction
set architecture. SGX uses chip-specific hardware keys to enable the construction
of secure execution containers called enclaves ; each enclave is isolated and supports
data sealing, local attestation, and remote attestation.
Enclave Isolation. SGX enclaves provide confidentiality2 and integrity for pro-
grams (and their data) running inside the enclave. This isolation is enforced by
processor reserved memory set aside during boot and accessible only to SGX mi-
crocode and programs running within enclaves; the memory is partitioned into 4k
pages, which are collectively referred to as the enclave page cache (EPC). Pages
in the EPC are exclusively associated with a particular enclave and can only be
accessed by that enclave. Information that is paged-out from the EPC into regular
2Side-channel attacks that compromise confidentiality of SGX enclaves have been identi-
fied [71, 39]; we assume such attacks cannot undermine the confidentiality of tagged values
handled by authorized enclaves.
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DRAM is encrypted under a hardware-derived key.
Data sealing. SGX enclaves are uniquely identified by an SGX Enclave Control
Structure, which includes a measurement—a 256-bit digest of a cryptographic
log recording the build process for the enclave. This measurement is used by
the key generation instruction (along with secrets embedded in the SGX chip)
to produce hardware-derived sealing keys. Sealing keys for an enclave depend on
both the measurement of the enclave and the hardware keys of the chip; sealed
data can only be decrypted by the enclave that originally sealed it. Data sealing
can provide confidentiality and integrity for audit logs and for tagged values that
will be temporarily stored or handled outside the enclave.
Local Attestation. Enclave measurements are also used for local attestation,
which allows one enclave to authenticate the program that is running in another
enclave. Local attestation (between enclaves) uses a hardware-signed (HMAC’d)
copy of the enclave measurement—the report—combined with a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol to prove the identity of the program in one enclave to the
second enclave. Local attestation is used for local program authentication.
Remote Attestation. SGX implements remote attestation using local attes-
tation together with a pair of dedicated, Intel-authored enclaves: a provisioning
enclave and a quoting enclave. The provisioning enclave requests an attestation
key from Intel and stores it sealed under a key that can only be derived by Intel-
authored enclaves. The quoting enclave retrieves the attestation key, verifies the
measurement using local attestation, and signs the measurement together with an
optional message; the resulting signed measurement-message pair, called a quote,
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can be verified using Intel’s Attestation Service.
Remote Authentication. Because communications between an application en-
clave and the quoting enclave are mediated by an untrusted (i.e., non-enclave)
application, quotes can be intercepted and replayed by any program. To miti-
gate this threat, our remote attestation protocol requires the application enclave
to fetch an application secret 〈s1, s2〉—where s2 = H(s1; kRS ) and kRS is a secret
key unique to the remote server RS—from RS across a secured communication
channel; this secret is used to prove to RS that a quote was generated by the
principal (an application enclave) at the end of the secured channel. To do so,
an application enclave sets s2 as the message used during measurement generation
and then requests a quote, resulting in a quote q(s2). To perform remote authenti-
cation, the application enclave sends the pair 〈s1, q(s2)〉 to the remote server. The
server authenticates the secret by checking that the quote message s2 is equal to
H(s1; kRS ), authenticates the quote with Intel’s attestation service, and then uses
the authenticated quote to make an authorization decision.
4.2 Enforcement by Source-based Monitoring
The first step in designing an enforcement architecture is to decide which principal
will be trusted to perform the monitoring. Principals are either policy providers
or service providers; a monitor can be run at either. Since policy providers are
trusted, it is natural to have policy providers run the monitors. In this source-based
monitoring architecture, SGX can be used to determine which applications (run-
ning remotely at a service provider) are authorized to use a given value. Assuming
that sensitive values can be processed only by a standard set of data analytics
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Figure 4.1: An overview of the different architecture designs. The direction of each
arrow indicates which principal instigates communication between two components
of the system. SGX enclaves are shown in gray; wide gray arrows indicate that
a program has authenticated using an SGX report (local attestation) or quote
(remote attestation).
functions, a source-based monitor can distinguish between authorized and unau-
thorized applications and, therefore, can enforce use-based privacy in the presence
of malicious service providers. Moreover, with all policy enforcement performed
at the policy provider, application developers do not need to handle policies or
explicitly interact with policy mechanisms, and policy enforcement is compatible
with legacy applications.
4.2.1 Designing a Source-based Monitor
Applications run by a service provider issue requests 〈r, x, c〉 to a policy provider,
where r is the type of request (e.g., GET values), x is a reference to the requested
data (required for requests that retrieve values), and c is a set of credentials. Tradi-
tional authentication tokens—e.g., OAuth tokens or signed statements—can attest
to the invoker type I and the purpose type P; we use SGX quotes as credentials for
the executable type E, as described in Section 4.1. Upon receiving a request, the
monitor validates the request, it retrieves the requested values (and their policy
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Figure 4.2: Detailed design for a policy provider that implements source-based
monitoring.
tags) from the data store, and then constructs a policy-compliant response. This
architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1a, and details (discussed below) are shown in
Figure 4.2.
To construct a policy-compliant response to a request for data, the monitor in-
vokes an authentication layer to authenticate the request credentials and determine
the use type (I,E,P) for the application that issued the request. We consider two
possible approaches. In a prevention-based monitor, the authentication layer com-
pares the authenticated credentials to a whitelist of known credentials in order to
determine the use type. This results in a monitor that enforces policy compliance
against malicious adversaries. In a detection-based monitor, the authentication
layer creates a log entry—including an identifier for the service provider, the au-
thenticated credentials, and the claimed use type—and then accepts the claimed
use type. Because a service provider could misstate the use type, a detection-based
monitor does not enforce policy compliance against malicious adversaries. Observe,
however, that the audit log ensures that incorrect use types can be detected after
the fact, so a detection-based monitor is sufficient to guarantee policy compliance
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in the presence of accountable adversaries.
After determining the use type, the monitor retrieves the requested values (and
their policy tags) from the data store. It then invokes an authorization layer, which
compares the use type to the use-based privacy policy defined by the policy tags
and constructs a policy-compliant response. The details of how this response is
constructed are implementation-specific and are discussed in Section 4.2.2.
Since we express use-based privacy as Avenance policies and since Avenance
policies are reactive, the monitor is also responsible for computing derived policies
and associating them with derived values. To do so, the monitor maintains a
taint store that maps applications to the Avenance policy(s) of the values that
application has received. Each time the monitor sends values to an application,
it adds the corresponding policies to the taint store entry for that application.
When the monitor receives a new value x from an application, it first invokes the
authentication layer to authenticate the request credentials and determine the use
type (I,P,E) and the application identifier aid. It then looks up the policy(s)
ρ associated with aid in the taint store, invokes the transition triggered by the
executable type E(aid) to produce a derived policy ρ′, constructs a tagged value
〈x, ρ′〉, and stores the new tagged value in the data store.
4.2.2 Implementation of Source-based Monitoring
A policy provider stores tagged values and distributes those values to service
providers; an implementation of a policy provider is described in Chapter 5. We
extended that policy provider to add source-based policy enforcement. The ex-
tended policy provider is implemented in 7634 lines of Java on top of an existing
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Ohmage [60, 67] data store.
Policy Enforcement. To ensure policy compliance, our extended policy provider
only accepts requests received over a TLS connection and accompanied by request
credentials. Credentials might include an OAuth token, a purpose label, and/or
an SGX quote and nonce n. OAuth credentials are authenticated and then used
to lookup the service provider identity spid—a unique identifier associated with
an OAuth client secret. Purpose labels are not authenticated; they are instead
interpreted as credentials of the form “U says P” for the user U defined by the
OAuth token and some purpose type P. SGX quotes are authenticated with the
Intel Attestation Service and then cached; the quote is also used to define the
application id aid. Finally, the policy provider determines the executable type: if
configured for prevention-based enforcement it compares the quote to a whitelist
of trusted enclaves, if configured for detection-based enforcement it accepts the
claimed enclave type after logging the request. The enforcement mode is set at
runtime using the command line argument --ENF.MODE. The policy provider then
performs monitoring as described in Section 4.2.1.
4.2.3 Evaluation of Source-based Monitoring
We deployed our policy provider with source-based monitoring on an Amazon EC2
T2.small instance with an Intel Xeon E5-2676 2.4 GHz CPU and 2GB of memory
running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (kernel version 3.13.0).
To evaluate performance, we measured latency and throughput of the policy
provider responding to a GET datapoints/scope request for 500 datapoints. We
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Figure 4.3: Latency and throughput of a policy provider with source-based mon-
itoring as a function of the number of concurrent requests, ranging from 1 to
50 concurrent requests. The solid black line shows performance when the policy
provider enforces datapoint-granularity policies and the dashed blue line shows
performance for dataset granularity.
Figure 4.4: Performance of the PMSys averaging function with source-based mon-
itoring.
tested the performance as the policy provider handled between 1 and 50 concurrent
requests. As shown in Figure 4.3, implementation choices—for example, whether
policies were associated with values at the granularity of individual datapoints
or for the full dataset—did impact the performance. But all implementations
overloaded at a relatively low load (less than 50 simultaneous requests), after
which throughput collapsed and latency drastically increased.
We also measured the performance of source-based monitoring for a common
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Policy Provider App Enclave App
1© 〈GET p, ca〉
2© 〈GET p, ca, ce〉
3© v
4© POST Avg(v)
3© GET avg
4© Avg(v)
Figure 4.5: Protocol for the PMSys averaging function in a source-based monitor-
ing architecture.
use case [5]: user preferences, legal regulations, and/or contractual terms restrict
uses for raw data but allow derived values (e.g., anonymized values, encrypted
values, or aggregated values) to be used more liberally. One such policy is depicted
in Example 2.9. A compliant service provider might first request the raw data,
generate the derived values, and then use the derived values.
To evaluate performance for this use case, we ported one such application,
called PMSys [56], to run on the source-based monitoring architecture. PMSys is a
mobile and web-based application developed jointly at Simula Research Laboratory
and UIT The Arctic University of Norway that performs physiological evaluation
and training-load personalization for soccer players. PMSys collects data about
player mood, sleep patterns, physical fitness, and injuries and displays aggregate
statistics (including average) to authorized coaches. These data are subject to
data-use restrictions derived both from the data-use contract signed by the players
(who all are members of elite clubs and national teams in Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark) and relevant national and EU privacy laws that restrict data sharing.
We measured the end-to-end latency of the PMSys averaging function on syn-
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thetic data matching the PMSys data collected for one month.3 To eliminate net-
work bottlenecks, we ran our policy provider on a dedicated Amazon EC2 R4.large
instance with an Intel Xeon dual-core E5-2686 2.3 GHz CPU and 15GB of memory
running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (kernel version 3.13.0). We deployed the application
on an OptiPlex 5040 with an SGX-enabled Intel Core i5-6500 3.20 GHz CPU and
16GB of memory running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (kernel version 4.4.0). As shown
in Figure 4.4, this averaging function experiences 35–62% overhead compared to
a baseline averaging function with no policy enforcement. However, poor per-
formance is unsurprising given the number of round-trips required; as shown in
Figure 4.5, this averaging function requires three round trips to the server in or-
der to enable the source-based monitor to mediate access to the derived (average)
value.
4.3 Enforcement by Delegated Monitoring
To mitigate the throughput bottleneck imposed by the monitor in a source-based
monitoring architecture, we turned to an alternative design. In a delegated moni-
toring architecture, service providers run the monitors in dedicated SGX enclaves,
which enables each monitor to authenticate itself to the policy provider. We assume
that there will only be a small number of implementations of delegated monitors,
so a policy provider can whitelist the credentials for delegated monitors to ensure
that tagged values are shared only with valid instances of a delegated monitor.
SGX is used here also to determine locally which applications run by the service
provider are authorized to use values, and it is used to provide confidentiality and
3Using actual data from the production system would have been incompatible with the existing
terms of service and Norwegian data protection laws.
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integrity for tagged values handled by a delegated monitor. As before, we assume
that sensitive values can only be processed by a standard set of data analytics
functions, so a delegated monitor can distinguish between authorized and unau-
thorized applications and, therefore, can enforce use-based privacy in the presence
of malicious service providers.
A delegated monitoring architecture requires each service provider to run a
monitor. Because each monitor is responsible for mediating the requests from
just one service provider, the delegated monitoring architecture eliminates the
performance bottleneck incurred by a source-based monitor. This architecture
also offers an opportunity to mitigate the second performance drawback of source-
based monitoring: the number of round-trips required for a typical application. In
the source-based architecture, it is necessary to send all derived values to the policy
provider, because the monitor (run by the policy provider) mediated all requests,
including requests for derived values. Because a delegated monitor is run locally
by a service provider, those round trips are no longer necessary. Instead policies
pertaining to derived values can be determined by the local monitor, and derived
tagged values can be cached locally using SGX sealing. This design improves
performance at the cost of introducing a burden on application developers, who
must now handle tagged values and must modify any legacy applications.
4.3.1 Designing a Delegated Monitor
Delegated monitors run by a service provider act as a proxy for untrusted ap-
plications: they issue requests to a policy provider and they mediate messages
to and from enclave applications. This architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1b,
and an example sequence of interactions is depicted in Figure 4.6. The design of
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1© 〈r, x, ca〉
2© 〈r, x, cm〉
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Figure 4.6: Example interactions with a delegated monitor.
the delegated monitor is the same as the source-based monitor design depicted in
Figure 4.2.
Delegated monitors accept requests 〈r, x, ca〉 from untrusted applications, where
r is the type of request (e.g., GET values), x is a reference to the requested data
(required for requests that retrieve values), ca is a set of invoker credentials (e.g.,
message 1© in Figure 4.6). A monitor then replaces the credentials ca with a set
of monitor credentials cm and issues the modified request 2© to a policy provider
in the form 〈r, x, cm〉. Upon receiving the request, the policy provider authenti-
cation layer checks the monitor credentials and then issues a response 3©. After
a monitor receives a response from a policy provider, it mediates the response to
enforce policy compliance. If the response contains no tagged values (e.g., an ac-
knowledgment), then it forwards the response to the untrusted application. If the
response contains tagged values 〈v, ρ〉, then the monitor invokes an authorization
layer, which compares the use type of the untrusted application (I,P, null)4—
determined by the internal authentication layer from the application credentials
4Note that the use type cannot define an executable type because untrusted applications do
not run inside SGX enclaves and therefore cannot produce the necessary credential—a quote—for
an executable type E.
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ca—to the use-based privacy policy defined by the policy tags and constructs a
policy-compliant response 4© Auth(v, ρ; ca). The details of how this response is
constructed depend on the granularity of the policy tags returned by the policy
provider, but the monitor forwards authorized values to the untrusted application
in plaintext and encrypts all other values using an SGX sealing key.5
Delegated monitors also mediate messages between untrusted applications and
trusted applications. Communication is always initiated by an untrusted applica-
tion, which sends a message 〈m, ca, eid〉 where m is either a set of tagged values
or sealed tagged values, ca is a set of invoker credentials, and eid is an enclave
application (e.g., message 5© in Figure 4.6). The monitor authenticates the in-
voker credentials to determine the invoker type I and purpose P, and then au-
thenticates the enclave application eid 6© and determines the executable type E.
It then invokes the authorization layer, which compares the use type (I,P,E) to
the use-based privacy policy defined by the (decrypted, if necessary) policy tags,
constructs a policy compliant message 7© Auth(m; ca, ce) (using SGX sealing, if
necessary), and forwards the resulting message to enclave eid. It also updates the
taint store entry for eid to include the policies for any tagged values sent to eid
in plaintext. When the monitor receives a response—a set of values 8© m′—it
looks up the policy ρ associated with eid in the taint store, invokes the transition
triggered by the executable type E to produce a derived policy ρ′, and constructs a
new set of tagged values from m′ and ρ′. Finally, it invokes the decision engine to
determine whether ρ′ authorizes the untrusted application (I,P, null), constructs a
policy compliant response 9© Auth(m′; ca) (using SGX sealing, if necessary), and
5This design eliminates unnecessary round-trips to the policy provider by caching encrypted
copies of tagged values with any application that is not authorized to use those values. This
caching might violate a use-based privacy policy unless we interpret policies as allowing encrypted
copies of tagged values to be used by any principal in any way. We consider such an interpretation
consistent with existing user preferences and legal requirements.
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forwards that response to the untrusted application.
4.3.2 Implementation of Delegated Monitoring
Policy Provider. We modified our policy provider to work in concert with del-
egated monitoring. It retains the same data store and policy association API
as in the source-based monitoring architecture, and it, too, can be configured to
construct tagged values at either datapoint granularity or dataset granularity.
Instead of mediating requests to enforce policy compliance, the modified pol-
icy provider uses an authentication layer to accept requests only over TLS from
delegated monitors. The policy provider authentication layer authenticates creden-
tials 〈s1, q, e〉 as described in Section 4.1 and determines the use type E using the
same authentication mechanism—either prevention-based or detection-based—as
the source-based monitor in Section 4.2. If the requester successfully authenti-
cates as a delegated monitor—denoted by the special use-type E = policyrm—the
policy provider returns the requested tagged values.
Delegated Monitor. We implemented a delegated monitor in 1149 lines of
C/C++ that runs as a dedicated SGX enclave. On initialization, the monitor
establishes its credentials 〈s1, q, e〉 for use in remote program authentication, as
described in Section 4.1: it retrieves an application secret (s1, s2) from the policy
provider, generates a quote q with message s2, and defines e = policyrm. All
subsequent requests to the policy provider are sent over TLS using a version of the
mbedtls client ported to run inside an SGX enclave [72]; these request include the
monitor credentials as a message header.
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Figure 4.7: Latency and throughput of a policy provider with client-side monitoring
(delegated monitoring or inline monitoring).
Policy Granularity. Like the source-based monitoring implementation, our im-
plementation of delegated monitoring supports policy tags at two different granu-
larities: individual datapoints and datasets.
Policy Enforcement. For efficiency, our delegated monitor exclusively imple-
ments prevention-based monitoring; it determines use types (I,P,E) by comparing
invoker and enclave credentials to a whitelist of known types.
4.3.3 Evaluation of Delegated Monitoring
We deployed our policy provider with delegated monitoring on the same Amazon
EC2 instances and the same local client that we used to evaluate source-based
monitoring.
We evaluated the performance of the policy provider in the delegated monitor-
ing architecture by reproducing the latency and throughput experiment we ran for
the source-based monitoring architecture. The simplified authentication layer run
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Figure 4.8: Performance of the PMSys averaging function with delegated monitor-
ing.
(a) Datapoint granularity (b) Dataset granualarity
Figure 4.9: Breakdown of the latency of the PMSys averaging function with dele-
gated monitoring.
by the policy provider eliminates the throughput bottleneck incurred by a source-
based monitor; this improved performance is evident for both datapoint granularity
and dataset granularity (Figure 4.7). Observe that implementing policy associa-
tion at the granularity of datasets results in a moderate increase in throughput
and a significant decrease in latency, as compared to the datapoint-granularity
implementation.
To evaluate the performance of the delegated monitor for the common aggregate-
then-use case, we ported the PMSys application—which requests values, com-
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putes the average in an SGX enclave, and then uses the average in an untrusted
application—to run in the delegated monitoring architecture. The reduced num-
ber of round trips significantly improves the performance of the averaging function,
as compared to the source-based monitoring architecture (Figure 4.8); there is a
3% overhead for dataset-granularity and the overhead is cut in half for datapoint-
granularity enforcement. Significant components of the remaining overhead are
due to the cost of sealing cached values (Figure 4.9). The majority of the latency
is due to enclave initialization, SSL negotiation, and fetching the raw data; these
costs are fixed. The majority of the remaining latency can be attributed to the
cost of enforcing policy compliance when caching raw data with the untrusted ap-
plication (which requires sealing the data) and when transferring cached, raw data
to the averaging enclave (which requires unsealing the data). This cost is likely to
increase for applications that handle more data (much of the difference in latency
between datapoint and dataset mode is due to the increase space required to store
policies at the granularity of individual datapoints).
4.4 Enforcement by Inline Monitoring
To eliminate the latency overhead imposed by sealing cached tagged values, we pro-
pose yet a third design. In an inline monitoring architecture, the service provider
performs monitoring inline with a monitored application, like the Tir system de-
scribed in Chapter 3.2,. The inline architecture enables applications to process
tagged values within a single enclave, eliminating the need to seal cached values.
But, as with Tir, application developers must instrument their code with monitor
calls, which is a burden.
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To ensure policy compliance, a policy provider must send tagged values only to
correctly-inlined applications running inside SGX enclaves. With many correctly-
inlined applications, a policy provider cannot be expected to maintain a database
identifying all. Prevention-based monitoring—in which the policy provider authen-
tication layer maintains a whitelist of authorized enclaves—is therefore infeasible.6
Instead, we focus on detection-based monitoring, and we design and implement an
inline monitor that will ensure policy compliance by accountable service providers.
4.4.1 Implementation of Inline Monitoring
We modified our Tir library described in Chapter 3 to run inside SGX enclaves.
When the monitor implemented by the library is configured with logging, it gen-
erates a secure audit log that contains a record for each invocation of a monitor
call that affects the state of the monitor—store policy, delete policy, trans, and
change use—and each time enforcement occurs—each invocation of use. A record
contains the monitor call, the arguments to the monitor call, and a record id (a
counter that is increased with each record). Each entry is encrypted using SGX
sealing and then written to a logfile stored in the local file system. Log records
cannot be modified because SGX sealing ensures integrity, and the counter ensures
that log records cannot be deleted. Note that an auditor uses the application to
retrieve (and unseal) the audit log—the correctness of this function is ensured be-
cause the policy provider logs the application quote—and the retrieval function
includes the current counter value, so truncations of the audit log can also be
6The preceding architectures do not have this constraint. In either a source-based monitoring
architecture or a delegated monitoring architecture, all service providers might use a common
set of data analysis enclave applications to manipulate tagged values; in a delegated monitoring
architecture, the policy provider must also authenticate the delegated monitor, but each ser-
vice provider runs an instance of the same (or one of a small number of) monitor enclave, so
prevention-based enforcement is a feasible option.
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Figure 4.10: Performance of inline monitoring library calls.
detected.
4.4.2 Evaluation of Inline Monitoring
The inlined applications are compatible with the policy provider implemented for
delegated monitoring, so the policy provider exhibits the same performance shown
in Figure 4.7.
To evaluate the performance of the inline monitor, we ran a series of mi-
crobenchmarks that evaluate the costs of various library calls. These results are
shown in Figure 4.10. We find that the detection-based implementation has higher
latency due to the additional cost of encrypting log entries with SGX sealing,
exiting the enclave, and writing the log entries to the logfile.
To evaluate the performance of the inline monitor for the common aggregate-
then-use case, we ported the PMSys application—which requests values, com-
putes the average in an SGX enclave, and then uses the average in an untrusted
application—to run in the inline monitoring architecture in prevention mode. As
shown in Figure 4.11, inline monitoring is within the error margin of the baseline
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Figure 4.11: Performance of the PMSys averaging function with inline monitoring.
Architecture Security Performance Deployability
Source-based malicious adversaries (X) poor (−) No programmer burden (X)
Delegated malicious adversaries (X) moderate (∼) some policy handling (∼)
Inline accountable adversaries (∼) good (X) significant annotations (−)
Figure 4.12: Tradeoffs between different monitoring architectures. Xindicates goals
that are fully met , ∼ indicates goals that are partially met, − indicates the
architecture failed goals.
system for dataset-granularity enforcement, and it offers significantly improved per-
formance (14% overhead) with datapoint granularity However, this performance
comes at the cost of increase the burden on application developers and an attenu-
ated threat model.
4.5 Comparing Approaches
In this chapter, we discuss the feasibility of using Intel SGX as a root of trust to en-
force such policies in the presence of an active adversary. The natural, source-based
monitoring architecture enables policy enforcement against malicious adversaries
with minimal effort for application developers, but it brings significant performance
overhead. So we explored two alternative architectures—delegated monitoring and
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inline monitoring—that offer improved performance and that demonstrate a trade-
off between deployability, security, and performance. A delegated monitoring ar-
chitecture provides the best performance against malicious adversaries, but an
inline monitoring architecture provides performance improvements—particularly
for applications that handle more data or require finer-grained policies—in an at-
tenuated threat model. Given the trade-offs between deployability, performance,
and security (summarized in Figure 4.12), we believe that the appropriate archi-
tecture will depend on the type of application. However, we view our results as
positive evidence of the feasibility of enforcing high-level use authorizations and
privacy policies in a decentralized, adversarial ecosystem.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY MANAGEMENT FOR USE-BASED PRIVACY
In the preceding chapters, we assumed that use-based privacy policies—perhaps
expressed as Avenance policies—would be associated with values to create tagged
values. Systems would operate on tagged values, ensuring that a policy would be
available whenever a sensitive value was used, thereby enabling enforcement. In
this chapter, we investigate the problem of how to associate policies with values.
A na¨ıve approach might require each user to establish an account with each
service provider, report values to each service provider, and associate each copy of
each value with the appropriate policy. This approach, however, imposes an unrea-
sonable burden on users. The burden of policy association might be alleviated by
requiring service providers perform policy association, but the resulting approach
would still burden users with the need to establish accounts with every service
provider while simultaneously requiring service providers to duplicate the work of
policy association. A better approach would delegate account management and
policy association to one, or a few, trusted principals who then mediate access to
the resulting tagged values.
This last approach is analogous to an identity-management system. Identity
management systems were developed as a reaction to problematic practices con-
cerning online identities: each service provider maintained a set of user identities,
so users had many identities (at least one for each service provider with which
they interacted), and this multitude of identities became a management burden
as well as creating many potential points of failure. Identity-management systems
enhance security and convenience by introducing a new class of principals called
identity providers.
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In this chapter, we survey existing identity management systems, and we draw
on the lessons learned from identity management to develop a policy provider for
storing values and associating use-based policies with user data.
5.1 Identity Management Systems
In an identity management system, an identity provider is trusted to perform
certain functions.
(1) It is responsible for authenticating users—i.e., determining whether a partic-
ular user is associated with a particular identity—and issuing authentication
assertions in support of these authenticated users. The manner in which an
identity provider authenticates users could affect whether service providers
accept authentication assertions issued by that identity provider.
(2) It stores identities—i.e., collections of attributes—for users and is responsible
for managing these identities. Details vary across systems but, generally, an
identity provider would have provisions for creating, updating, releasing, and
deleting attributes and identities.
(3) It provides evidence or authentication assertions that service providers can
use to make authorization decisions.
Service providers depend on receiving authentication assertions that contain cur-
rent attributes, so an identity provider is not only be responsible for validating
attributes initially—that is, verifying their value in connection to a real-world
identity—but might also maintain currency of those attributes. The methods used
for validating attributes (including whether to trust the user or to perform in-
dependent validation of claimed attributes) and for eliminating or updating stale
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attributes often determine whether a service provider will accept authentication
assertions issued by some identity provider.1
Existing identity management systems2 can be divided into three classes:
• Single Sign-on: Systems designed to issue authentication assertions to mul-
tiple service providers after a single user authentication. Examples include
Passport3 [44], OpenID4 [50], Shibboleth [64], and Facebook Single Sign-
On [25].
• Federated Identity : Systems designed to manage multiple distinct identities
for a single user and to issue authentication assertions on the basis of any
of these identities. Examples include Project Liberty5 [59], Higgins [30],
PRIME [58], CardSpace [16], and Client-Side Federation [13].
• Anonymous Credentials : Systems designed to provide authentication asser-
tions that do not reveal the user’s identity to a service provider. Examples
include Idemix [11, 12], U-Prove [51], and P-IMS [34, 65].
Identity management systems can also be characterized by some key design
choices; these design choices revolve around each system’s solutions the problems
of attribute storage and attribute confidentiality.
1In some systems, attribute validation, management, and/or storage are delegated to a sepa-
rate party called the attribute provider.
2Detailed overviews of some well known identity management systems appear in the Ap-
pendix D.
3Microsoft’s Passport is no longer supported; this system is being included for historical
reasons.
4Although our primary focus is on systems and implementations, we discuss the OpenID
specification because it has no representative implementation.
5Project Liberty was merged into SAML 2.0 (the specification implemented by Shibboleth
and various enterprise identity solutions) and is no longer actively maintained. It is included for
historical reasons, because there are no existing representative implementations.
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5.1.1 Attribute Storage
In identity management systems, identities are stored and maintained by iden-
tity providers. Existing systems have developed several approaches regarding the
nature and distribution of identity providers; these approaches differ in their sup-
port for unlinkability—a property that concerns permanently or temporarily hiding
correlations between identities.
Centralized. A centralized identity management system is one in which a sin-
gle, dedicated identity provider manages all identities. In systems that adopt this
design, a user must trust the identity provider, and all of that user’s attributes
are disclosed to this identity provider. Note, when a user chooses to create mul-
tiple distinct identities (e.g., a personal identity and a work identity), patterns
in attribute value or use could allow the identity provider to link multiple identi-
ties to the same individual, because all identities are stored by the same identity
provider. Since information that links user identities and actions performed under
those identities is economically valuable, identity providers have an incentive to
favor a centralized identity management system. Passport and Facebook Single
Sign-On are examples of centralized systems.
Federated. A federated identity management system represents an intermediate
design point in which a user chooses which identity providers to trust with links
between certain identities associated with that user. Project Liberty supports this.
There, identity providers that have established business relations form circles of
trust. Within a circle of trust, a user can opt to federate two identities, in which
case the identity providers exchange information and the identities are linked.
67
P
as
sp
or
t
L
ib
er
ty
Id
em
ix
S
h
ib
b
ol
et
h
H
ig
gi
n
s
P
R
IM
E
O
p
en
ID
C
ar
d
S
p
ac
e
U
-P
ro
ve
C
S
-F
ed
er
at
io
n
P
-I
M
S
F
ac
eb
o
ok
S
S
O
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Federated × X × × × × × × × X × ×
Decentralized × × X X X X X X X × X ×
Figure 5.1: Existing approaches to attribute storage
Client-Side Federation is also a federated identity management system, but it is
designed to ensure that local handles are only known to the user (not the identity
provider) thereby guaranteeing privacy against identity providers that collude with
service providers.
Decentralized. A decentralized identity management system includes multiple,
distinct identity providers that each function separately, possibly using different
protocols, and may not even be aware of each other. A user can create one or
more identities with any identity provider in the system. This architecture allows
users to choose which identity providers to trust with which attributes, and it also
allows a user to distribute sensitive attributes across distinct identity providers,
thereby ensuring unlinkability of distinct identities. The approach has been widely
adopted by existing identity management systems (e.g., Idemix, Shibboleth, Hig-
gins, PRIME, OpenID, CardSpace, U-Prove, and P-IMS).
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5.1.2 Attribute Confidentiality
Principals can learn user attributes through three channels: intentional channels
(P receives the attributes directly from U or from some identity provider IDP
acting on behalf U), attribute forwarding (P acquires the attributes from another
party P ′), and attribute inference (P deduces the attributes from other known or
observed information).
Intentional channels are instigated by users. Design choices here focus on how
users control what attributes to release, when, and to which principals. These
design choices can be applied both to direct release of attributes by a user and to
dissemination of attributes by an identity provider acting on behalf of a user.
Instance-based Attribute Release. Under this approach, the user explic-
itly specifies whether information may be released to a principal that requests
it. Instance-based attribute release is extremely flexible, since users can make de-
cisions based on any factors available at the time the request occurs. However, this
approach can be inconvenient, since it requires the user to make many decisions
and since determining which service providers to trust can be difficult. Nonethe-
less, many existing identity management systems today provide instance-based
attribute release to control the dissemination of attributes to service providers.
CardSpace and Higgins service providers send the user a policy (described using
HTML or WS-SecurityPolicy) specifying required attributes and authentication
assertion types. The user must then (interactively) decide whether to share the
requested attributes with the service provider and, if so, which available identity
to use. Facebook Single Sign-on presents the user with permissions requested by
the service provider, which the user must choose to accept or deny. Mechanisms
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for controlling attribute release are beyond the scope of the OpenID specification,
but the OpenID Attribute Exchange protocol specification does permit responses
that indicate an attribute is not available (using attribute.count=0). The Google
OpenID identity provider leverages this capability and gives users an option to per-
mit or deny the release of each attribute required by the service provider (with an
option to remember selected permissions for future interactions with that service
provider).
Policy-based Attribute Release. With this approach, a user defines a policy,
and an attribute is released to a service provider if and only if the specified policy is
satisfied for that attribute. The policy can involve attribute type, attribute value,
party identity, or properties of the party when defining the conditions for attribute
release. In a typical implementation, the identity provider (or an active client
acting for the user) will automatically determine which parties should receive spe-
cific attributes on the basis of the user’s policy. Although policy-based attribute
release is typically less expressive than instance-based (depending on the language
in which policies are written), policy-based release simplifies the user experience
by automating the dissemination of attributes. Policy-based attribute release is
employed by Passport, Shibboleth, and PRIME. Passport employs a very restric-
tive language for expressing user policies. A user labels each attribute as public
or private. Attributes are then automatically released to other parties based
on these labels: attributes labeled public are sent to any service provider with
which the user chooses to interact. In Shibboleth, attribute release is controlled
by an attribute filter, which is a collection of policy rules. Each policy rule con-
sists of a single requirement rule—it determines whether the policy rule is binding
for a particular authentication request—and zero or more attribute rules—these
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specify which attributes are governed by the policy rule and whether or not those
attributes will be released. Each policy rule is expressed using a flexible policy
language and can depend on each of the parties involved as well as attribute type
and value. The PRIME system makes extensive use of policies that govern data
access, data release, and data handling. A user and a service provider both define
policies. Starting from these, the system automatically negotiates conditions of
data release; this negotiation can, but does not necessarily, include active user
input. A successful negotiation finds a solution that satisfies both parties’ policies;
such a solution is required before any attribute will be disclosed. PRIME software,
running locally at the service provider, is designed to automatically enforce any
conditions that are agreed during the negotiation.
Attribute forwarding occurs when a party P acting on its own initiative dis-
closes an attribute to another party P ′. An example is when a service provider that
sells goods forwards a user’s address to a service provider that arranges delivery.
Attribute forwarding is invisible to the user, but some identity management sys-
tems introduce mechanisms that allow users to prevent or control such disclosures,
nevertheless.
Deniable Attributes. Deniable attributes cannot be validated without cooper-
ation from an identity provider or user. This embodies the philosophy that the
significant concern about attribute release is whether parties can prove to oth-
ers that a user satisfies some particular attribute—not whether those parties can
merely learn or claim the user satisfies those attributes. The approach is widely
adopted in existing identity management systems. Systems that employ interac-
tive authentication implement deniable attributes by encrypting assertions with a
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shared secret key (Passport and OpenID) or by sending service providers a refer-
ence that will be validated interactively only with explicit user permission (Project
Liberty and Shibboleth). Systems that employ credential-based authentication can
implement deniable attributes by requiring the presenting party to know a par-
ticular secret in order for the credential to be validated (Idemix, U-Prove, and
P-IMS).
Policy Tags. Another approach to control attribute forwarding involves the use
of policy tags. PRIME supports policy tags to implement control over data use (in-
cluding attribute forwarding); a policy negotiation phase occurs prior to attribute
release, and all released attributes are tagged with policies that are mutually agreed
during that phase. Policy tags can specify notification requirements, deletion re-
quirements, and limitations on forwarding or other uses of attributes. PRIME
relies on a combination of legal accountability and secure hardware as the basis
for users to trust that policy tags are enforced; legal accountability ensures service
providers use correctly-installed trusted hardware modules, the trusted hardware
generates cryptographic assertions that tagged attributes are accessed only by
PRIME software, and legal accountability can be invoked if correct assertions are
not received.
Attribute inference occurs when a party P can deduce the value of an attribute
from other information known to P . Attribute inference, like attribute forwarding,
is not controlled by users, so design choices again concern whether and how to
control or prevent principals from learning (or using) inferred attributes.
Attributes can be inferred from user behavior, including websites visited and
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Intentional
Instance × ? X X X × ? X X X X X
Policy X ? × X × X ? × × × × ×
Forwarding
Deniable X X X X ? X X ? X × × ×
Policy Tags × × × × ? X × ? × × × ×
Inference Mitigation × × × × ? X × ? × × × ×
Figure 5.2: Existing approaches to attribute confidentiality
items viewed or purchased, or from other attributes.6 One standard defense against
attribute inference is to minimize the amount of information that P learns—this
can be done by limiting the types of user behavior that can be detected or observed
by P and by limiting the attributes that P can learn over other channels. If a party
has prior access to information about particular user action or attribute, then
it is impossible to prevent that party from learning whatever attributes can be
inferred from that information alone. However, in many cases, accurate attribute
inference requires linking many different pieces of information and even performing
statistical analysis. A second standard defense is, therefore, to prevent linking
between attributes disclosed in different interactions.
5.2 Designing a Policy Provider
Drawing on our experience with identity management systems, we adopt a model
in which data and policies are stored with a user-trusted entity called the policy
6Preventing attribute inference is related to the problem of privacy-conscious information dis-
closure. There has been extensive work on this subject in the context of databases, culminating
in the notion of differential privacy [23] for database queries—the goal of which is to prevent an
adversary from inferring attributes that could not be deduced from previously available informa-
tion.
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provider. A policy provider acts as a proxy for values sent by a user client:
(1) It stores values and policies.
(2) It is responsible for associating the appropriate use-based privacy policy with
stored attributes.
(3) It might be responsible for ensuring that attributes are distributed and used
only in compliance with the associated policies (e.g., using one of the schemes
described in Chapter 4).
Policy providers implement policy-based attribute release. They release at-
tributes only to invokers authorized by the associated Avenance policies and only
for the purposes and executables specified by those policies. Released values are
tagged with a policies; a service provider who receives a tagged value from a policy
provider may only use that attribute in compliance with the associated policy tag.
Policy providers, which store attributes for many users, also have the potential
to analyze data and detect correlated attributes; they could potentially tag raw
values with policies that ensure that sensitive attributes inferred from the raw
values will be associated with the appropriate policies. For example, a policy
provider might detect a correlation between age and graduation date that might
allow service providers to use graduation date as a proxy for age; if a use-based
privacy policy defines restrictions on how age may be used, the policy provider
might associate use restrictions with graduation date.
In the context of use-based authorizations, there is no reason to trust policy
providers not to collude. We therefore envision a decentralized architecture includ-
ing many, independently operated policy providers (managed by different parties)
from which users can choose. Each policy provider defines or imports one or more
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namespaces, thus defining the set of labels that can be used to express policies
stored with that policy provider. The choice of namespace therefore imposes re-
strictions on what policies can be expressed.
5.3 Implementing a Policy Provider for Ohmage
We implemented a policy provider as an extension of an existing mobile health plat-
form called Ohmage [60, 67]. Ohmage is an open-source system designed to facili-
tate distributed data collection and analysis for health studies and applications—an
ideal candidate for use-based authorizations. It has been used for dozens of real-
world studies and also serves as the backend for several production applications.
Ohmage is designed with a classic three-tiered architecture, comprising a back-end
database, a server component implemented in the Spring Boot framework [66],
and a family of front-end mobile applications. Our policy provider is implemented
in 7634 lines of Java on top of the existing Ohmage server. This implementation
interfaces with Tir as described in Chapter 3.2; it can also be extended to interact
with the SGX-based enforcement mechanisms as described in Chapter 4.
Data Store. The backend of Ohmage is a secure, Open mHealth-compliant data
store that can be accessed through an API. The data store operates on datapoints,
each comprised of header information (id, schema, time, source) and a json-
encoded body; datapoints are classified by schema. The API allows operations
for storing and retrieving datapoints: GET datapoints/{id}, GET datapoints,
POST datapoints, and GET datapoints/scope. We extend the Ohmage data
store to store tagged values and enforce policy tags by storing values as datapoints
in Ohmage and storing tagged policies in a local MySQL database.
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Policy Association. Our implementation supports both discretionary (data-
subject defined) policies and mandatory (admin defined) policies through a new
POST policy API call, which allows data subjects to modify the policy for their
own datapoints and allows admins to modify the mandatory policies applied to
all stored datapoints. The API has operations to modify the policy for a single
specified datapoint or update the set of preference rules—policies that apply to
all future incoming datapoints that match the specified schema. Requests to store
datapoints can also specify an existing policy using the optional HTTP header
AvPolicy.
Policy Granularity. Avenance policies could be associated with atomic values
(e.g., integers) or with structured values (e.g., health records) under control of a
single principal; policies could also be associated with aggregate objects contain-
ing information about many different users. Our policy provider enforces policies
at the granularity of individual datapoints—in which case a request for multi-
ple datapoints returns only the authorized datapoints—or at the granularity of
datasets—in which a request for multiple datapoints is authorized only if all re-
quested datapoints are authorized. The granularity can be configured at runtime
using the command line argument --GR.MODE.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
Use-based Privacy. Use-based privacy was first introduced by Cate [14] as a
solution to the problems presented by “notice and consent” and the underlying
guidelines—the Fair Information Practice Principles [18]—that defined acceptable
standards for handling sensitive data. Observing that users rarely make use of
either opt-ins or opt-outs and typically don’t make informed decisions about access
to their data, Cate proposed a new approach. His work explored the legal and
philosophical implications of use-based privacy; the feasibility of a technical regime
for expressing or enforcing use-based privacy was not addressed.
Alternate Privacy Regimes. Many systems have been developed with the goal
of expressing and enforcing privacy. However, none were intended to formalize,
express, or enforce use-based privacy. Alternate approaches either focus exclusively
on private information transmission rather than controlling usage as information
flows through a networked information system (e.g., [47, 23, 53, 55]) or are unable
to express the full range of reactive policies required for use-based privacy (e.g., [24,
63]).
Contextual Integrity [47] is a philosophical approach to privacy that has been
formalized as a logic for reasoning about privacy [2]. Because contextual integrity
defines privacy relative to socially-determined informational norms, contextual in-
tegrity can be interpreted as a special case of use-based privacy that focuses on
data collection and data sharing. Transmissions are authorized when they occur
in an appropriate context, as determined by social norms. The emphasis on a
societal determination of acceptable or non-harmful uses (rather than informed
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consent or data minimization) is closely aligned with the philosophy of use-based
privacy. However, the exclusive focus on data transmission limits the applicability
of existing formalizations. And although this approach supports a limited form
of reactive policies based on contextual events (i.e., changes in context), it does
not fulfill the full requirements for use-based privacy. In particular, this approach
does not support policy synthesis for derived values, and it does not include sticky
policies or obligations. It therefore cannot be used to pervasively monitor how
sensitive information is used as it flows through a networked information system.
Differential privacy [23] classifies a response to a database query as a privacy
violation unless the algorithm used to generate the response satisfies a specific
statistical property (viz., ε-differential privacy). This definition has been formal-
ized and implemented as an extensible platform for privacy-preserving data analy-
sis [43]. However, differential privacy, like contextual integrity, focuses exclusively
on defining authorized transmissions. Although this approach can be interpreted as
a limited form of reactive policies (raw data cannot be transmitted, ε-differentially
private derived values can be transmitted), it does not fulfill the full requirements
for use-based privacy. In particular, this approach does not support general pol-
icy synthesis for derived values, and it does not include contextual events, sticky
policies, or obligations. So like contextual integrity, it cannot be used to perva-
sively monitor how sensitive information is used as it flows through a networked
information system.
Usage Control (UCON) [53, 54] is an extension of traditional access control
models (e.g., discretionary access control, mandatory access control, role-based
access control) that enables continuity of access decisions. Initial UCON systems
enforced policies on a single system, but later versions introduced distributed usage
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control [57, 31]. UCON can be interpreted as supporting a limited form of reactive
policies—those with only contextual events—since access decisions can depend on
context (e.g., time) and/or mutable attributes (e.g., number of previous access)
and access control decisions are re-evaluated after the context changes. Despite
the name, however, UCON does not allow access decisions to depend on the type
of use. Moreover, it does not support policy synthesis for derived values. UCON,
therefore, cannot effectively restrict how sensitive information is used as it flows
through a system.
An alternative privacy approach was outlined by Petkovic´ et al. [55], who con-
sider a restricted form of use-based authorization, which they call purpose control.
Their work creates an audit log of service provider actions and then detects policy
violations by checking whether the audit trail is a valid execution of the organi-
zational process—modeled as a formula in the Calculus of Orchestration of Web
Services (COWS)—for a permitted purpose. This work does not consider the
invoker or the program type. Moreover, this approach does not support policy
synthesis for derived values. Purpose control, therefore, cannot effectively restrict
how sensitive information is used as it flows through a system.
Datta et al. [20] propose an alternative approach termed use privacy, which
restricts the use of protected information types and their proxies—correlated and
causally related data types. Although there is no support for reactive policies, the
restrictions on proxies fulfill a similar role to history-dependent authorizations in
limiting how information (rather than merely values) can be used. Their work gives
an algorithm for detecting proxy use in data-driven systems (e.g., machine learning
systems) and for eliminating “inappropriate” proxy uses. Although general use-
based restrictions are beyond the scope of this work, their approach effectively
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restricts information use by a single centralized system.
Downgrading policies [17, 40] are data use policies that specify how data should
be used prior to declassification, under what conditions declassification is permit-
ted, and how data should be treated after declassification. Conditions might in-
clude environmental events or provenance. Downgrading policies are expressive;
they also offer formal guarantees that can be enforced with a language type system.
However, downgrading policies lack a flexible means to express how policies might
depend on sequences of events.
Thoth [24] is a kernel-level compliance layer that tracks data flow through a
system and enforces declarative data use policies. The Thoth policy language
specifies data use policies in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and declassification
policies, each of which defines which principals are authorized and under what con-
ditions. Although policies are designed to be expressed at a lower level than under
our approach, Thoth’s conditions are sufficiently flexible to capture policies that
depend on who, what, or why as well as temporal, discretionary, autocratic, and
jurisdictional policies. The language does not, however, support reactive policies
and is therefore ill-suited to use-based privacy.
Grok [63] is a system that uses compile-time information flow analysis to en-
force privacy compliance in the Bing search engine. Privacy policies are expressed
in Legalease, a privacy policy language that implicitly supports use-based poli-
cies encoded as domain-specific attributes. For example, a legalese policy might
say, “DENY DataType IPAddress, UseForPurpose Advertising EXCEPT ALLOW
DataType IPAddress:Truncated”; this policy states that the full IP address may not
be used for advertising. Grok automatically maps code-level schema elements to
datatypes, minimizing the need for programmer annotations. However, Legalease
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does not support reactive policies that depend on contextual events, including
obligations. It also assumes that policies are defined by a centralized authority
for enforcement in a centralized system; it does not support compound policies
defined by multiple policies or policy synthesis for derived values whose inputs
have different policies. Legalease is therefore insufficient to express the full range
of use-based privacy policies.
Automata Policies. Avenance policies use privacy automata as policy rules
to instantiate the reactive approach to use-based privacy proposed in this paper.
Automata have long been used to model secure systems [28] and reference mon-
itors [61, 27]. Under these frameworks, an automaton models or monitors the
execution of a single program. The automaton can be interpreted as a policy for
the monitored program; acceptance by the automaton means that the program is
correct (or policy-compliant).
Pardo et al. [52] propose an automata-based approach to specifying dynamic
privacy policies for online social networks. This work expresses evolving policies, in
which the current privacy policy is activated or deactivated by contextual events.
For example, “Co-workers cannot see my posts while I am not at work”. These
policies are parameterized over a static privacy policy language. The proposed
approach does not admit synthesis events as state transitions and provides no
means to construct policies for derived values.
Policy Enforcement with SGX SGX offers a new basis for placing trust in a
monitor or other program, so it is a natural tool for enabling policy enforcement in
distributed systems where service providers are operated by untrusted principals.
Several previous projects have explored similar ideas.
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Haven [3] uses SGX to create a shielded execution environment, allowing un-
modified Windows application binaries to be hosted inside SGX enabled enclaves.
Applications then interface with a library version of the Windows operating system
running entirely inside the enclave, reducing the dependencies on the underlying
system. Moreover, Haven implements a shielding module for interfacing with com-
ponents outside of the enclave, which provides access to, among other things, an
encrypted and integrity protected file system. While the design of Haven places
the entire OS inside an enclave—allowing for applications to be securely monitored
by existing enforcement mechanisms—our approach yields a smaller trusted com-
puting base. Our work also supports policy enforcement in distributed systems.
VC3 [62] is a system for trustworthy data analytics in the cloud; it is a MapRe-
duce framework that uses SGX to protect sensitive data. VC3 enforces confidential-
ity and integrity for code and data, and it enforces verifiability of code execution;
it does not support enforcement for high-level, use-based authorization.
Ryoan [33] is a distributed sandbox for performing computations on sensitive
data. Ryoan uses SGX enclaves to protect data confidentiality and integrity from
malicious service providers; it does not support enforcement for high-level, use-
based authorization.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
To be effective, an approach to privacy needs to be compatible with modern
practices for data collection, data sharing, and data use. Use-based privacy has
promise; this dissertation describes an investigation into the techincal feasibility
of delivering on that promise.
We identify requirements for a successful use-based privacy regime, deduce that
a reactive approach is essential to expressing use-based privacy, and we vet this
requirement with a user study. We also introduce Avenance policies, a language
that implements a reactive instantiation of use-based privacy. We evaluate the
expressiveness of this instantiation by expressing the full set of data use policies
defined in HIPAA and in Facebook’s site privacy policy as Avenance policies.
Observing that adversaries are service providers who often have non-technical
incentives to ensure policy compliance, we describe tools for facilitating policy
compliance by separating policy from code and by enabling automated compliance
checking. But since service providers might not be benign, we also investigate the
feasibility of using Intel SGX as a root of trust to enforce policies in the presence of
adversarial service providers. We describe trade-offs between deployability, secu-
rity, and performance, and we demonstrate that compliance can be achieved with
moderate performance overhead.
Finally, drawing on lessons from identity management systems, we describe a
policy provider for associating policies with sensitive values.
We view our results as evidence of the feasibility of a reactive approach to use-
based privacy. Widespread adoption will likely require further investigation into
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the tradeoffs of various mechanisms for expressing and enforcing use-based privacy
in real-world systems, but we view this work a promising step towards developing
a privacy-enhancing, use-based privacy ecosystem for the modern world.
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APPENDIX A
USER STUDY
What follows is the verbatim text of the user study we ran on May 29, 2018 to
assess whether a reactive language would be well suited to collective user prefer-
ences.
Survey Instructions We are researchers trying to understand what people’s
priorities are regarding information privacy and how the private information is
used. For each question, indicate your preferences.
Section 1: General Questions
1. Have you every adjusted your privacy preferences on Facebook or a similar
site:
(a) Never (b) At least once (c) Often (d) I don’t have an account
2. Consider your preferences for how companies or websites should use your
personal data. In general, might your privacy preferences change if:
• The data were coarsened (for example, your location was defined as the
city you are currently in instead of street address you are currently at):
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure
• Only aggregate statistics were used (for example, the application only
used the most popular locations across all its users, not your location
individually or the application only used the average age of a user, not
your personal age):
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure
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• Only aggregate statistics were used (for example, the application only
used the most popular locations across all its users, not your location
individually or the application only used the average age of a user, not
your personal age):
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure
• Time had passed (for example, only information that was more than 2
years old was used. (a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure
3. Are you reading the questions and making an effort to answer them honestly?
(a) Yes (b) No (c) Not sure
4. Current privacy controls online rely on notice and consent: Each website
posts its privacy policy, and by using the site you agree to the terms in the
policy. How often do you read these policies?
(a)Never (b) Occasionally (c) I look at all of them (d) I read them carefully.
5. Some privacy experts have suggested replacing notice and consent with ind-
ustry-wide requirements preventing harmful uses (as determined by user
studies or privacy experts). How comfortable would you be with that al-
ternative?
(a) Very uncomfortable (b) Somewhat uncomfortable
(c) Somewhat comfortable (d) Very comfortable
Section 2: Example Application—Medical Information
1. Assume that your hospital or another organization that stores and accesses
your medical information is trying to decide on a new data privacy policy.
How comfortable would you be with each of the following proposed policies:
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(a) Very uncomfortable (b) Somewhat uncomfortable
(c) Somewhat comfortable (d) Very comfortable
• My medical information may be used in any way by anyone for any
purpose.
• My medical information may be used to provide medical care to me.
• My medical information may be used for marketing or advertising.
• My medical information may be used to conduct medical research.
• My medical information may be used to conduct medical research if I
am notified of the use and the purpose of the research.
• Anonymous versions of my medical information may be used in any way
by anyone for any purpose.
• Anonymous versions of my medical information may be used to provide
medical care to me.
• Anonymous versions of my medical information may be used for mar-
keting or advertising.
• Anonymous versions of my medical information may be used to conduct
medical research.
• Anonymous versions of my medical information may be used to conduct
medical research if I am notified of the use and the purpose of the
research.
• Aggregate statistics derived from my medicial information and that of
others may be used in any way by anyone for any purpose.
• Aggregate statistics derived from my medicial information and that of
others may be used to provide medical care.
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• Aggregate statistics derived from my medicial information and that of
others may be used for marketing or advertising.
• Aggregate statistics derived from my medicial information and that of
others may be used to conduct medical research.
• Aggregate statistics derived from my medicial information and that of
others may be used to conduct medical research if I am notified of the
use and the purpose of the research.
2. Are there particular conditions or circumstances that might change your
answers?
3. Are you reading the questions and answering them honestly?
4. Is there some policy other you would like the hospital to follow regarding
your information?
Section 3: Example Application—Social Network Data
1. Assume that a social network you use (e.g., Facebook) is trying to decide
on a new data privacy policy. How comfortable would you be with each
of the following proposed policies: (a) Very uncomfortable (b) Somewhat
uncomfortable (c) Somewhat comfortable (d) Very comfortable
• My posts may be publicly shown.
• My posts may be shared with friends.
• My posts may be used to recommend posts and events I might like.
• My posts may be used to recommend third-party apps (e.g., games)
that I might like.
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• My posts may be used to select ads I might be interested in.
• My posts may be used to conduct research.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be publicly shown.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be shared with friends.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be used to recommend posts and
events I might like.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be used to recommend third-party
apps (e.g., games) that I might like.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be used to select ads I might be
interested in.
• Anonymous versions of my posts may be used to conduct research.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be publicly shown.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be shared with friends.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be used to recommend posts
and events I might like.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be used to recommend third-
party apps (e.g., games) that I might like.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be used to select ads I might
be interested in.
• Aggregate statistics about my posts may be used to conduct research.
2. Are there particular conditions or circumstances that might change your
answers?
3. Are you reading the questions and answering them honestly?
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4. Is there some other policy you would like the social network application to
follow regarding your information?
Section 4: Demographic Information
1. Where are you from (nationality, current residence, or whichever region you
identify with most):
(a) United States (b) North America (non-US) (c) South/Central Amer-
ica (d) European Union (e) Europe (non-EU) (f) Asia (g) Africa (h) Aus-
tralia/Pacific Islands
2. What is your age?
(a) Younger than 18 (b) 18-22 (c) 23-35 (d) 36-65 (e) Older than 65
3. What is your gender?
(a) Male (b) Female (c) Decline to state/Do not identify with a binary gender
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APPENDIX B
ENCODING HIPAA AS DATA-USE TUPLES
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ti
n
g
a
su
sp
ec
t,
fu
g
it
iv
e,
m
a
-
te
ri
a
l
w
it
n
es
s,
o
r
m
is
si
n
g
p
er
so
n
in
re
sp
o
n
se
to
a
la
w
en
-
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l’
s
re
q
u
es
t
§1
64
.5
12
(f
)(
3)
(i
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
ab
ou
t
an
an
in
d
iv
id
-
u
al
w
h
o
is
or
is
su
sp
ec
te
d
to
b
e
a
v
ic
ti
m
of
a
cr
im
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
f-
fi
ci
a
l
fo
r
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
in
re
sp
o
n
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l’
s
re
-
q
u
es
t,
if
th
e
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d
v
id
u
a
l
a
g
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es
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3)
(i
i)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
ab
ou
t
an
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
w
h
o
is
or
is
su
sp
ec
te
d
to
b
e
a
v
ic
ti
m
of
a
cr
im
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
f-
fi
ci
a
l
fo
r
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
in
re
sp
o
n
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
ffi
-
ci
a
l’
s
re
q
u
es
t
a
n
d
if
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
is
u
n
a
b
le
to
o
b
ta
in
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l’
s
a
g
re
em
en
t
b
ec
a
u
se
o
f
in
ca
p
a
ci
ty
o
r
o
th
er
em
er
g
en
cy
ci
rc
u
m
st
a
n
ce
,
p
ro
-
v
id
ed
th
a
t:
(A
)
th
e
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
a
t
su
ch
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
o
n
is
n
ee
d
ed
to
d
et
er
m
in
e
w
h
et
h
er
a
v
io
la
ti
o
n
o
f
la
w
b
y
a
p
er
so
n
o
th
er
th
a
n
th
e
v
ic
ti
m
h
a
s
o
cc
u
rr
ed
,
a
n
d
su
ch
in
-
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
is
n
o
t
in
te
n
d
ed
to
b
e
u
se
d
a
g
a
in
st
th
e
v
ic
ti
m
,
(B
)
th
e
la
w
en
-
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
a
t
im
-
m
ed
ia
te
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
ct
iv
it
y
th
a
t
d
ep
en
d
s
u
p
o
n
th
e
d
is
cl
o
su
re
w
o
u
ld
b
e
m
a
te
ri
a
ll
y
a
n
d
a
d
v
er
se
ly
a
ff
ec
te
d
b
y
w
a
it
in
g
u
n
ti
l
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
is
a
b
le
to
a
g
re
e
to
th
e
d
is
cl
o
su
re
,
a
n
d
(C
)
th
e
d
is
cl
o
su
re
is
in
th
e
b
es
t
in
te
re
st
s
o
f
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
a
s
d
et
er
m
in
ed
b
y
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
,
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th
e
ex
er
ci
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o
f
p
ro
-
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n
a
l
ju
d
g
m
en
t
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64
.5
12
(f
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4)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
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ab
ou
t
an
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
w
h
o
h
as
d
ie
d
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
f-
fi
ci
a
l
a
le
rt
in
g
la
w
en
fo
rc
e-
m
en
t
o
f
th
e
d
ea
th
o
f
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
if
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
h
a
s
a
su
sp
ic
io
n
th
a
t
su
ch
d
ea
th
m
ay
h
av
e
re
su
lt
ed
fr
o
m
cr
im
in
a
l
co
n
d
u
ct
§1
64
.5
12
(f
)(
5)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
at
io
n
th
at
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
b
el
ie
ve
s
in
go
o
d
fa
it
h
co
n
st
it
u
te
s
ev
id
en
ce
of
cr
im
in
al
co
n
d
u
ct
th
a
t
o
cc
u
rr
ed
on
th
e
p
re
m
is
es
of
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
o
f-
fi
ci
a
l
fo
r
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
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(f
)
(6
)(
i)
(A
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
e-
m
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l
fo
r
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
§1
64
.5
12
(f
)
(6
)(
i)
(B
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
e-
m
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l
fo
r
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
§1
64
.5
12
(f
)
(6
)(
i)
(C
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
e-
m
en
t
o
ffi
ci
a
l
fo
r
a
la
w
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
§1
64
.5
12
(g
)(
1)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
co
ro
n
er
o
r
m
ed
ic
a
l
ex
a
m
in
er
fo
r
th
e
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
id
en
ti
-
fy
in
g
a
d
ec
ea
se
d
p
er
so
n
,
d
et
er
m
in
in
g
a
ca
u
se
o
f
d
ea
th
,
o
r
o
th
er
d
u
ti
es
a
s
a
u
th
o
ri
ze
d
b
y
la
w
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
th
a
t
a
ls
o
p
er
-
fo
rm
s
th
e
d
u
-
ti
es
o
f
a
co
ro
-
n
er
o
r
m
ed
ic
a
l
ex
a
m
in
er
u
se
fo
r
th
e
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
id
en
ti
-
fy
in
g
a
d
ec
ea
se
d
p
er
so
n
,
d
et
er
m
in
in
g
a
ca
u
se
o
f
d
ea
th
,
o
r
o
th
er
d
u
ti
es
a
s
a
u
th
o
ri
ze
d
b
y
la
w
§1
64
.5
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(g
)(
2)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
fu
n
er
a
l
d
ir
ec
-
to
rs
co
n
si
st
en
t
w
it
h
a
p
p
li
ca
b
le
la
w
,
a
s
n
ec
es
sa
ry
to
ca
rr
y
o
u
t
th
ei
r
d
u
ti
es
w
it
h
re
-
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
d
ec
ed
en
t
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
fu
n
er
a
l
d
ir
ec
-
to
rs
if
n
ec
es
sa
ry
fo
r
fu
n
er
a
l
d
i-
re
ct
o
rs
to
ca
rr
y
o
u
t
th
ei
r
d
u
ti
es
a
n
d
in
re
a
so
n
a
b
le
a
n
ti
ci
p
a
ti
o
n
o
f,
th
e
in
d
i-
v
id
u
a
ls
d
ea
th
§1
64
.5
12
(h
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
o
rg
a
n
p
ro
-
cu
re
m
en
t
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
s
o
r
o
th
er
en
ti
ti
es
en
-
g
a
g
ed
in
th
e
p
ro
cu
re
-
m
en
t,
b
a
n
k
in
g
,
o
r
tr
a
n
s-
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
ca
d
av
er
ic
o
rg
a
n
s,
ey
es
,
o
r
ti
ss
u
e
fo
r
th
e
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
fa
ci
li
-
ta
ti
n
g
o
rg
a
n
,
ey
e
o
r
ti
s-
su
e
d
o
n
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
tr
a
n
s-
p
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n
ta
ti
o
n
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)(
1)
(i
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
fo
r
re
se
a
rc
h
p
ro
v
id
ed
th
a
t:
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
o
b
ta
in
s
d
o
cu
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
th
a
t
a
n
a
lt
er
a
ti
o
n
to
o
r
w
a
iv
er
,
in
w
h
o
le
o
r
in
p
a
rt
,
o
f
th
e
in
d
iv
id
-
u
a
l
a
u
th
o
ri
za
ti
o
n
re
q
u
ir
ed
b
y
1
6
4
.5
0
8
fo
r
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
su
re
o
f
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
a
ti
o
n
h
a
s
b
ee
n
a
p
p
ro
ve
d
b
y
ei
th
er
:
(A
)
a
n
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l
R
ev
ie
w
B
o
a
rd
(I
R
B
),
o
r
(B
)
a
p
ri
va
cy
b
o
a
rd
§1
64
.5
12
(i
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1)
(i
i)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
fo
r
re
se
a
rc
h
p
ro
v
id
ed
th
a
t
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
o
b
ta
in
s
fr
o
m
th
e
re
se
a
rc
h
er
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t:
(A
)
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
su
re
is
so
u
g
h
t
so
le
ly
to
re
-
v
ie
w
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
s
n
ec
-
es
sa
ry
to
p
re
p
a
re
a
re
se
a
rc
h
p
ro
to
co
l
o
r
fo
r
si
m
il
a
r
p
u
rp
o
se
s
p
re
p
a
ra
to
ry
to
re
se
a
rc
h
,
(B
)
n
o
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
is
to
b
e
re
m
ov
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
b
y
th
e
re
se
a
rc
h
er
in
th
e
co
u
rs
e
o
f
th
e
re
v
ie
w
,
a
n
d
(C
)
th
e
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
u
se
o
r
a
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es
s
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u
g
h
t
is
n
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r
th
e
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a
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h
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u
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o
se
s
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64
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(i
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1)
(i
ii
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a-
ti
on
ab
ou
t
a
d
ec
ed
en
t
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
fo
r
re
se
a
rc
h
p
ro
v
id
ed
th
a
t
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
o
b
ta
in
s
fr
o
m
th
e
re
se
a
rc
h
er
:
(A
)
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
th
a
t
th
e
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
su
re
so
u
g
h
t
is
so
le
ly
fo
r
re
se
a
rc
h
o
n
th
e
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
d
ec
ed
en
ts
,
(B
)
d
o
cu
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
,
a
t
th
e
re
q
u
es
t
o
f
th
e
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
,
o
f
th
e
d
ea
th
o
f
su
ch
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
,
a
n
d
(C
)
re
p
re
-
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
th
a
t
th
e
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
a
ti
o
n
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
su
re
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u
g
h
t
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n
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r
th
e
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se
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u
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)
(1
)(
i)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
-
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
p
er
so
n
o
r
p
er
so
n
s
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
b
el
ie
ve
s,
in
g
o
o
d
fa
it
h
,
to
b
e
re
a
so
n
a
b
ly
a
b
le
to
p
re
ve
n
t
o
r
le
ss
en
th
e
th
re
a
t,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
th
e
ta
rg
et
o
f
th
e
th
re
a
t
if
th
e
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
,
in
g
o
o
d
fa
it
h
,
b
el
ie
ve
s
th
e
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
-
su
re
is
n
ec
es
sa
ry
to
p
re
ve
n
t
o
r
le
ss
en
a
se
ri
o
u
s
a
n
d
im
m
in
en
t
th
re
a
t
to
th
e
h
ea
lt
h
o
r
sa
fe
ty
o
f
a
p
er
so
n
o
r
th
e
p
u
b
li
c
§1
64
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(j
)
(1
)(
ii
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(o
n
ly
st
at
em
en
t
an
d
(f
)(
2)
(i
)
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
)
n
ot
le
ar
n
ed
in
co
u
rs
e
of
tr
ea
tm
en
t
to
aff
ec
t
p
ro
p
en
si
ty
to
co
m
m
it
th
e
cr
im
in
al
co
n
d
u
ct
or
co
u
n
se
li
n
g
or
th
er
ap
y
or
th
ro
u
gh
a
re
q
u
et
b
y
th
e
in
d
i-
v
id
u
al
to
in
it
ia
te
to
b
e
re
fe
rr
ed
fo
r
tr
ea
t-
m
en
t,
co
u
n
se
li
n
g,
or
th
er
ap
y
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
if
th
e
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
,
in
g
o
o
d
fa
it
h
,
b
el
ie
ve
s
th
e
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
-
su
re
is
n
ec
es
sa
ry
fo
r
la
w
en
fo
rc
e-
m
en
t
a
u
th
o
ri
ti
es
to
id
en
ti
fy
o
r
a
p
p
re
h
en
d
a
n
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l:
(A
)
b
e-
ca
u
se
o
f
a
st
a
te
m
en
t
b
y
a
n
in
-
d
iv
id
u
a
l
a
d
m
it
ti
n
g
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
in
a
v
io
le
n
t
cr
im
e
th
a
t
th
e
co
v
-
er
ed
en
ti
ty
re
a
so
n
a
b
ly
b
el
ie
ve
s
m
ay
h
av
e
ca
u
se
d
se
ri
o
u
s
p
h
y
si
ca
l
h
a
rm
to
th
e
v
ic
ti
m
,
o
r
(B
)
w
h
er
e
it
a
p
p
ea
rs
fr
o
m
a
ll
th
e
ci
rc
u
m
-
st
a
n
ce
s
th
a
t
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
h
a
s
es
ca
p
ed
fr
o
m
a
co
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ec
ti
o
n
a
l
in
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i-
tu
ti
o
n
o
r
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o
m
la
w
fu
l
cu
st
o
d
y
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)(
1)
(i
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
-
fo
rm
at
io
n
of
in
d
iv
id
-
u
al
s
w
h
o
ar
e
ar
m
ed
fo
rc
es
p
er
so
n
n
el
co
v
er
ed
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
fo
r
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
d
ee
m
ed
n
ec
es
sa
ry
b
y
a
p
p
ro
-
p
ri
a
te
m
il
it
ar
y
co
m
-
m
a
n
d
a
u
th
or
it
ie
s
to
a
ss
u
re
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ex
-
ec
u
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
m
il
i-
ta
ry
m
is
si
o
n
if
th
e
a
p
p
ro
p
ri
a
te
m
il
it
a
ry
a
u
-
th
o
ri
ty
h
a
s
p
u
b
li
sh
ed
b
y
n
o
ti
ce
in
th
e
fe
d
er
a
l
re
g
is
te
r
th
e
fo
ll
ow
-
in
g
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
:
(A
)
a
p
p
ro
p
ri
-
a
te
m
il
it
a
ry
co
m
m
a
n
d
a
u
th
o
ri
-
ti
es
,
a
n
d
(B
)
th
e
p
u
rp
o
se
s
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
e
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
a
ti
o
n
m
ay
b
e
u
se
d
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
d
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(i
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h
in
fo
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n
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a
m
em
b
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m
u
st
in
cl
u
d
e
in
a
n
y
fu
n
d
ra
is
in
g
m
a
te
ri
a
ls
it
se
n
d
s
to
a
n
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
u
n
d
er
th
is
p
a
ra
g
ra
p
h
a
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
f
h
ow
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
m
ay
o
p
t
o
u
t
o
f
re
ce
iv
in
g
a
n
y
fu
rt
h
er
fu
n
d
ra
is
-
in
g
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s,
(i
ii
)
th
e
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
m
u
st
m
a
ke
re
a
so
n
a
b
le
eff
o
rt
s
to
en
su
re
th
a
t
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
w
h
o
d
ec
id
e
to
o
p
t
o
u
t
o
f
re
ce
iv
in
g
fu
tu
re
fu
n
d
ra
is
-
in
g
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
n
o
t
se
n
t
su
ch
co
m
m
u
n
i-
ca
ti
o
n
s
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n
O
b
je
c
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In
v
o
k
e
r
A
c
ti
o
n
P
u
rp
o
se
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
§1
64
.5
14
(g
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
th
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
cr
ea
ti
o
n
,
re
n
ew
a
l,
o
r
re
-
p
la
ce
m
en
t
o
f
a
co
n
tr
a
ct
o
f
h
ea
lt
h
in
su
ra
n
ce
o
r
h
ea
lt
h
b
en
efi
ts
o
n
ly
a
s
re
q
u
ir
ed
b
y
la
w
§1
64
.5
22
(a
)(
1)
(i
ii
)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
if
C
E
a
g
re
es
to
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
(a
)(
1
)(
i)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
u
se
if
C
E
a
g
re
es
to
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
(a
)(
1
)(
i)
,
a
n
d
if
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
w
h
o
re
q
u
es
te
d
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
is
in
n
ee
d
o
f
em
er
g
en
cy
tr
ea
tm
en
t
a
n
d
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
is
n
ee
d
ed
to
p
ro
v
id
e
th
e
em
er
g
en
cy
tr
ea
tm
en
t
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
a
h
ea
lt
h
ca
re
p
ro
v
id
er
to
p
ro
v
id
e
su
ch
tr
ea
t-
m
en
t
to
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
if
C
E
a
g
re
es
to
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
(a
)(
1
)(
i)
a
n
d
if
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
w
h
o
re
-
q
u
es
te
d
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
is
in
n
ee
d
o
f
em
er
g
en
cy
tr
ea
tm
en
t
a
n
d
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
r-
m
a
ti
o
n
is
n
ee
d
ed
to
p
ro
v
id
e
th
e
em
er
g
en
cy
tr
ea
tm
en
t
a
n
d
th
e
co
v
-
er
ed
en
ti
ty
m
u
st
re
q
u
es
t
th
a
t
su
ch
h
ea
lt
h
ca
re
p
ro
v
id
er
n
o
t
fu
rt
h
er
u
se
o
r
d
is
cl
o
se
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
§1
64
.5
24
(a
)(
1)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
(e
x
ce
p
t
p
sy
ch
.
n
ot
es
an
d
in
fo
co
m
p
il
ed
in
fo
r
u
se
in
a
ci
v
il
,
cr
im
in
al
,
o
r
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
ac
ti
on
)
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
n
o
la
te
r
th
a
n
3
0
d
ay
s
a
ft
er
re
ce
ip
t
o
f
th
e
re
q
u
es
t
§1
64
.5
26
(a
)(
1)
p
ro
te
ct
ed
h
ea
lt
h
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
a
m
en
d
o
n
re
q
u
es
t
b
y
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l,
n
o
la
te
r
th
a
n
6
0
d
ay
s
a
ft
er
re
ce
ip
t
o
f
su
ch
a
re
q
u
es
t
§1
64
.5
28
(a
)(
1)
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
of
d
is
cl
os
u
re
s
co
ve
re
d
en
ti
ty
d
is
cl
o
se
to
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
n
o
la
te
r
th
a
n
6
0
d
ay
s
a
ft
er
re
ce
ip
t
o
f
su
ch
a
re
q
u
es
t
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APPENDIX C
ENCODING FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY POLICY AS DATA-USE
TUPLES
P
ro
v
is
io
n
O
b
je
c
t
In
v
o
k
e
r
A
c
ti
o
n
P
u
rp
o
se
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
W
e
ar
e
ab
le
to
d
el
iv
er
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
,
p
er
so
n
al
iz
e
co
n
te
n
t,
an
d
m
ak
e
su
gg
es
ti
on
s
fo
r
yo
u
b
y
u
si
n
g
th
is
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
h
ow
yo
u
u
se
an
d
in
te
ra
ct
w
it
h
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
an
d
th
e
p
eo
p
le
or
th
in
gs
y
ou
re
co
n
n
ec
te
d
to
an
d
in
te
re
st
ed
in
on
an
d
off
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
.
th
in
gs
yo
u
d
o
a
n
d
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
yo
u
p
ro
v
id
e,
th
in
g
s
o
th
er
s
d
o
a
n
d
in
fo
r-
m
at
io
n
th
ey
p
ro
v
id
e,
y
o
u
r
n
et
w
o
rk
s
an
d
co
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s,
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
b
o
u
t
p
ay
m
en
ts
,
d
ev
ic
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
,
in
fo
r-
m
at
io
n
fr
om
w
eb
si
te
s
a
n
d
a
p
p
s
th
a
t
u
se
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
,
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
th
ir
d
-p
ar
ty
p
a
rt
n
er
s,
a
n
d
in
fo
rm
a
-
ti
on
fr
om
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
cr
ea
te
m
o
d
el
o
f
h
ow
yo
u
u
se
a
n
d
in
te
ra
ct
w
it
h
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
a
n
d
th
e
p
eo
p
le
o
r
th
in
g
s
yo
u
re
co
n
n
ec
te
d
to
a
n
d
in
te
re
st
ed
in
o
n
a
n
d
o
ff
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
m
o
d
el
of
h
ow
yo
u
u
se
a
n
d
in
te
ra
ct
w
it
h
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
a
n
d
th
e
p
eo
p
le
o
r
th
in
gs
yo
u
re
co
n
n
ec
te
d
to
a
n
d
in
te
r-
es
te
d
in
on
a
n
d
o
ff
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
d
el
iv
er
o
u
r
S
er
-
v
ic
es
m
o
d
el
of
h
ow
yo
u
u
se
a
n
d
in
te
ra
ct
w
it
h
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
a
n
d
th
e
p
eo
p
le
o
r
th
in
gs
yo
u
re
co
n
n
ec
te
d
to
a
n
d
in
te
r-
es
te
d
in
on
a
n
d
o
ff
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
p
er
so
n
a
li
ze
co
n
te
n
t
m
o
d
el
of
h
ow
yo
u
u
se
a
n
d
in
te
ra
ct
w
it
h
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
a
n
d
th
e
p
eo
p
le
o
r
th
in
gs
yo
u
re
co
n
n
ec
te
d
to
a
n
d
in
te
r-
es
te
d
in
on
a
n
d
o
ff
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
m
a
ke
su
g
g
es
-
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
yo
u
W
e
al
so
u
se
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
w
e
h
av
e
to
p
ro
v
id
e
sh
or
tc
u
ts
an
d
su
gg
es
ti
on
s
to
y
ou
.
F
or
ex
-
am
p
le
,
w
e
ar
e
ab
le
to
su
gg
es
t
th
at
yo
u
r
fr
ie
n
d
ta
g
yo
u
in
a
p
ic
tu
re
b
y
co
m
p
ar
in
g
y
ou
r
fr
ie
n
d
’s
p
ic
tu
re
s
to
in
fo
rm
a-
ti
on
w
e’
ve
p
u
t
to
ge
th
er
fr
om
yo
u
r
p
ro
fi
le
p
ic
tu
re
s
an
d
th
e
ot
h
er
p
h
ot
os
in
w
h
ic
h
yo
u
’v
e
b
ee
n
ta
gg
ed
.
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
p
ro
v
id
e
sh
o
rt
cu
ts
a
n
d
su
g
-
g
es
ti
o
n
s
to
y
o
u
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ro
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io
n
O
b
je
c
t
In
v
o
k
e
r
A
c
ti
o
n
P
u
rp
o
se
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
W
h
en
w
e
h
av
e
lo
ca
ti
on
in
fo
rm
a-
ti
on
,
w
e
u
se
it
to
ta
il
or
ou
r
S
er
-
v
ic
es
fo
r
y
ou
an
d
ot
h
er
s,
li
k
e
h
el
p
-
in
g
yo
u
to
ch
ec
k
-i
n
an
d
fi
n
d
lo
ca
l
ev
en
ts
or
off
er
s
in
y
ou
r
ar
ea
or
te
ll
yo
u
r
fr
ie
n
d
s
th
at
yo
u
ar
e
n
ea
rb
y.
lo
ca
ti
on
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
ta
il
o
r
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
fo
r
yo
u
a
n
d
o
th
er
s
W
e
co
n
d
u
ct
su
rv
ey
s
an
d
re
se
ar
ch
,
te
st
fe
at
u
re
s
in
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t,
an
d
an
al
y
ze
th
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
w
e
h
av
e
to
ev
al
u
at
e
an
d
im
p
ro
ve
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
an
d
se
rv
ic
es
,
d
ev
el
op
n
ew
p
ro
d
-
u
ct
s
or
fe
at
u
re
s,
an
d
co
n
d
u
ct
au
-
d
it
s
an
d
tr
ou
b
le
sh
o
ot
in
g
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s.
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
a
n
a
ly
ze
to
ev
a
lu
a
te
a
n
d
im
p
ro
ve
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
a
n
d
se
rv
ic
es
,
d
e-
ve
lo
p
n
ew
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
o
r
fe
a
tu
re
s,
a
n
d
co
n
d
u
ct
a
u
d
it
s
a
n
d
tr
o
u
b
le
sh
o
o
ti
n
g
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
W
e
u
se
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
se
n
d
yo
u
m
ar
ke
ti
n
g
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s,
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e
w
it
h
yo
u
ab
ou
t
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
an
d
le
t
yo
u
k
n
ow
ab
ou
t
ou
r
p
ol
ic
ie
s
an
d
te
rm
s.
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
w
it
h
yo
u
m
a
rk
et
in
g
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
w
it
h
yo
u
to
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
a
b
o
u
t
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
w
it
h
yo
u
to
le
t
yo
u
k
n
ow
a
b
o
u
t
o
u
r
p
o
li
ci
es
a
n
d
te
rm
s
W
e
al
so
u
se
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
re
-
sp
on
d
to
y
ou
w
h
en
yo
u
co
n
ta
ct
u
s.
yo
u
r
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
to
re
sp
o
n
d
to
yo
u
w
h
en
yo
u
co
n
-
ta
ct
u
s
W
e
u
se
th
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
w
e
h
av
e
to
im
p
ro
ve
ou
r
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g
an
d
m
ea
-
su
re
m
en
t
sy
st
em
s
so
w
e
ca
n
sh
ow
yo
u
re
le
va
n
t
ad
s
on
an
d
off
ou
r
S
er
-
v
ic
es
an
d
m
ea
su
re
th
e
eff
ec
ti
ve
n
es
s
an
d
re
ac
h
of
ad
s
an
d
se
rv
ic
es
.
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
u
se
to
im
p
ro
ve
o
u
r
a
d
ve
rt
is
in
g
a
n
d
m
ea
su
re
-
m
en
t
sy
st
em
s
so
w
e
ca
n
sh
ow
yo
u
re
le
va
n
t
a
d
s
o
n
a
n
d
o
ff
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
u
se
to
m
ea
su
re
th
e
eff
ec
ti
ve
n
es
s
a
n
d
re
a
ch
o
f
a
d
s
a
n
d
se
rv
ic
es
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O
b
je
c
t
In
v
o
k
e
r
A
c
ti
o
n
P
u
rp
o
se
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
W
e
u
se
th
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
w
e
h
av
e
to
h
el
p
ve
ri
fy
ac
co
u
n
ts
an
d
ac
ti
v
it
y,
an
d
to
p
ro
m
ot
e
sa
fe
ty
an
d
se
cu
ri
ty
on
an
d
off
of
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
,
su
ch
as
b
y
in
v
es
ti
ga
ti
n
g
su
sp
ic
io
u
s
ac
ti
v
it
y
or
v
io
la
ti
on
s
of
ou
r
te
rm
s
or
p
ol
i-
ci
es
.
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
to
h
el
p
ve
ri
fy
a
cc
o
u
n
ts
a
n
d
a
ct
iv
it
y
th
e
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
w
e
h
av
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
to
p
ro
m
o
te
sa
fe
ty
a
n
d
se
cu
ri
ty
o
n
a
n
d
o
ff
o
f
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
W
e
u
se
co
ok
ie
s
an
d
si
m
il
ar
te
ch
-
n
ol
og
ie
s
to
p
ro
v
id
e
an
d
su
p
p
or
t
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
an
d
ea
ch
of
th
e
u
se
s
ou
tl
in
ed
an
d
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
th
is
se
c-
ti
on
of
ou
r
p
ol
ic
y.
co
ok
ie
s
a
n
d
si
m
i-
la
r
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
to
p
ro
v
id
e
a
n
d
su
p
p
o
rt
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
a
n
d
ea
ch
o
f
th
e
u
se
s
o
u
tl
in
ed
a
n
d
d
e-
sc
ri
b
ed
in
th
is
se
ct
io
n
o
f
o
u
r
p
o
li
cy
W
h
en
yo
u
sh
ar
e
an
d
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e
u
si
n
g
ou
r
S
er
v
ic
es
,
yo
u
ch
o
os
e
th
e
au
d
ie
n
ce
w
h
o
ca
n
se
e
w
h
at
yo
u
sh
ar
e.
F
or
ex
am
p
le
,
w
h
en
yo
u
p
os
t
on
F
ac
eb
o
ok
,
yo
u
se
le
ct
th
e
au
d
i-
en
ce
fo
r
th
e
p
os
t,
su
ch
as
a
cu
s-
to
m
iz
ed
gr
ou
p
of
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s,
al
l
of
yo
u
r
F
ri
en
d
s,
or
m
em
b
er
s
of
a
G
ro
u
p
.
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
yo
u
sh
ar
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
sh
a
re
w
it
h
p
eo
p
le
p
er
-
m
it
te
d
b
y
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
u
n
ti
l
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
se
t-
ti
n
g
s
ch
a
n
g
e
W
h
en
y
ou
u
se
th
ir
d
-p
ar
ty
ap
p
s,
w
eb
si
te
s
or
ot
h
er
se
rv
ic
es
th
at
u
se
,
or
ar
e
in
te
gr
at
ed
w
it
h
,
ou
r
S
er
-
v
ic
es
,
th
ey
m
ay
re
ce
iv
e
in
fo
rm
a-
ti
on
ab
ou
t
w
h
at
yo
u
p
os
t
or
sh
ar
e.
w
h
at
yo
u
p
o
st
o
r
sh
ar
e
F
a
ce
b
o
o
k
sh
a
re
w
it
h
th
o
se
th
ir
d
-
p
a
rt
y
a
p
p
s,
w
eb
si
te
s
o
r
o
th
er
se
rv
ic
es
th
a
t
u
se
,
o
r
a
re
in
te
g
ra
te
d
w
it
h
,
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
w
h
en
y
o
u
u
se
th
ir
d
-
p
a
rt
y
a
p
p
s,
w
eb
-
si
te
s
o
r
o
th
er
se
r-
v
ic
es
th
a
t
u
se
,
o
r
a
re
in
te
g
ra
te
d
w
it
h
,
o
u
r
S
er
v
ic
es
In
ad
d
it
io
n
,
w
h
en
yo
u
d
ow
n
lo
ad
or
u
se
su
ch
th
ir
d
-p
ar
ty
se
rv
ic
es
,
th
ey
ca
n
ac
ce
ss
y
ou
r
p
u
b
li
c
p
ro
fi
le
,
w
h
ic
h
in
cl
u
d
es
yo
u
r
u
se
rn
am
e
or
u
se
r
ID
,
yo
u
r
ag
e
ra
n
ge
an
d
co
u
n
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APPENDIX D
DETAILS OF EXISTING IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
This appendix discusses historical and current identity management solutions
in chronological order, and it sketches design choices made by each. We dis-
cuss Passport, Project Liberty, Idemix, Shibboleth, Higgins, PRIME, OpenID,
CardSpace, U-Prove, P-IMS, and Facebook Single Sign-On. The primary focus is
implementations rather than specifications, but we do discuss identity management
specifications for which there are no representative implementations (e.g., Project
Liberty, OpenID). Specifications for which a representative implementation exists
(e.g., SAML, OASIS-IMS, WS-InfoCard) are covered by the systems we discuss
that implement those specifications.
D.1 Passport (1999)
Passport is an identity management system introduced by Microsoft in 1999; it
is no longer actively supported. Microsoft ran the sole identity provider in the
system, and service providers joined the Passport system by registering with Mi-
crosoft, at which time they received a unique SiteID and a DES encryption key.
After registering, a service provider could delegate identity management and user
authentication to Microsoft.
Like many early identity management systems, Passport employed interactive
authentication (thereby allowing the identity provider to both detect user actions
and observe the context in which those actions occur). When a user requested
access to a protected resource or service, the service provider redirected the request
to a Passport server (locations were periodically published) and included the SiteID
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and a return URL as parameters. The Passport server verified the SiteID and
returned URL against the list of registered service providers; if they matched,
then Passport authenticated the user (either by acquiring a valid email-password
combination and setting a DES-encrypted cookie or by reading a previously-defined
cookie). Passport then encrypted the user’s Passport Unique Identifier (PUID),
timestamp, and public profile information under the service provider’s DES key and
redirected the user’s browser to the return URL, with the encrypted information
included as a parameter. The service provider decrypted the information and used
it to make an authorization decision.
The centralized Passport identity provider stored a database of user identities.
Each identity consisted of a unique identifier (PUID), authentication credentials
(email, password, and an optional four-digit security key), and attributes. Nothing
prevented Microsoft from linking different identities on the basis of source, usage,
or attribute. Authentication assertions issued by Passport servers contained the
unique PUID (so the system is pseudonymous) and, therefore, service providers
could link an authorization request to the identity issuing that request, and could
link two requests made with the same identity.
Passport provided minimal support for confidentiality. Since Microsoft ran the
only identity provider, all attributes were stored on Microsoft servers; attributes
were sent to a service provider on the basis of tags that labeled the attribute
as either public or private. Attributes could be collected by Passport during
registration (e.g., email address) or could be contributed by a service provider. All
attributes (except PUID) were private by default, but a user could voluntarily
set attribute tags to public.
Initially, the only attribute was an email address, but users and service providers
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could add other attributes. Certain types of information—e.g., financial information—
were tagged as wallet attributes by Passport. Wallet attributes were disclosed only
after receiving explicit, interactive, permission from the user. Attributes were en-
crypted using a private, shared key, so they were deniable. However, there was
no support for obligations, and there was no protection against attackers inferring
attributes from user actions or from other attributes.
Passport was never widely adopted. Several theories attempt to explain why.
The most prevalent concerns the limited support Passport offered for user privacy—
in particular, user actions were detectable, observable, and linkable. Moreover,
Microsoft, as the exclusive identity provider in the system, was in a position to
take advantage of these privacy vulnerabilities. The discovery of several security
vulnerabilities in the Passport implementation [36] also undermined confidence in
Passport.
D.2 Project Liberty (2001)
The Liberty Alliance was a group of companies formed in 2001 to define stan-
dards that would enable individuals and businesses to engage in secure, private
transactions by leveraging federated identity management systems. The standards
were collectively referred to as Project Liberty, and involved three phases, released
incrementally:
• Phase 1: Identity federation and single sign-on,
• Phase 2: A framework for building identity services (including attribute
sharing),
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• Phase 3: Interoperable identity services (including services to manage iden-
tities and profiles).
In 2005, the Project Liberty specifications were incorporated into SAML 2.0,
a specification implemented by Shibboleth 2.0 and various enterprise identity so-
lutions. The organization aspects of the Liberty Alliance were subsequently sub-
sumed by the Kantara Initiative.
Since Project Liberty was a set of specifications rather than a specific imple-
mentation, it admitted multiple design choices. It specified three possible control
flows that supported authentication assertions: Artifact-based, POST-based, and
Liberty-Enabled Client-based. The first two approaches were interactive, while
the third was a form of active-client authentication. All three approaches allowed
identity providers to detect user actions and to observe the context in which those
actions occur. The three specified control flows are summarized in Figure D.1.
(a) Artifact-based (b) POST-based (c) LEC-based
Figure D.1: Types of Delegated Authentication Specified in Project Liberty
The Liberty Alliance envisioned a world in which (1) businesses would form
circles of trust based on contractual agreements and (2) users would have an option
to link or federate local identities within an established circle of trust. If a user
chose to federate an identity, then the identity provider published an introduction
to service providers in the same circle of trust (how this was implemented was
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not fixed by the Liberty Project specification, but use of a common domain was
suggested). Service providers could federate or link a local identity with the identity
stored at the identity provider using such introductions. Identities that were stored
with un-federated identity providers (e.g., those in different circles of trust) could
not.
By default, the authorization protocol was pseudonymous (the user is referred
to by a local, shared handle), and user actions could be linked to an identity.
However, the specification also included an option for the service provider to en-
able anonymous authorization using a temporary identifier. Whether a service
provider could link two actions depended on whether the service provider opted
for pseudonymous authorization; the use of an authentication credential could al-
ways be linked to its issuance.
The Project Liberty specifications allowed authentication assertions to include
information about the authentication context [42] and user attributes [35]. How
the system implemented user control over attribute confidentiality was beyond the
scope of the Project Liberty specification, but the documentation recommended
that disclosure of user attributes be governed by identity provider policies, user
permissions, and interaction with the user. In the Bluewin [6] implementation of
Project Liberty, users were asked to consent to attribute sharing when federating
identities and when accessing the provider in question [68]. The specification did
include some protection against attribute disclosure by third parties (i.e., attribute
forwarding); since users were referred to by local handles, authentication responses
(including any asserted attributes) were deniable. Project Liberty provided no
mechanism to prevent attribute inference.
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D.3 Idemix (2001)
Idemix is an anonymous credential system first proposed by researchers at IBM
Zurich in 2001. Idemix is currently in a pilot phase, where it is employed in
government, banking, and telecommunications; it is available as a Java library.
Enhanced versions have also been used in the PRIME and Higgins projects.
All identity providers and service providers in the system generate and publish
public keys that can be used for encrypting messages and verifying digital signa-
tures. Each user U generates a secret key SU that is used to generate pseudonyms
for that user. U can establish an identity NIDP(SU) that consists of attributes
{attr1, . . . , attrn} with an identity provider IDP.
Idemix is a credential-based system, so user actions are undetectable to the
identity provider. A user U obtains a credential C(IDP, NIDP, {attr1, . . . , attrn})
from an identity provider IDP by presenting authentication credentials for identity
NIDP. Credentials can be issued as one-time credentials, can be issued with an expi-
ration date, or can be issued with a parameter that can be validated using a global
revocation manager. To subsequently access a service provider SP, a user U demon-
strates possession of an appropriate credential. If a local pseudonym NSP(SU) has
previously been established with the service provider, then U proves knowledge
of a credential that incorporates the desired set of attributes and was issued to a
pseudonym N ′ that is linked to the same secret key as the local pseudonym NSP;
if not, then U simply proves knowledge of a credential that incorporates the de-
sired set of attributes and was issued to a pseudonym N ′ for which U knows the
corresponding secret key.
Because the proof of knowledge employed during credential presentation re-
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quires the presenter to know secret key SU , the Idemix protocol can ensure that
any user U ′ who can successfully present a credential issued to a user U can suc-
cessfully use all of U ’s credentials. This functionality is intended to prevent users
from sharing the secret key with others. The secret key SU can also be tied to
knowledge of an external secret (e.g., bank account information), providing an
additional incentive for users to keep their credentials private.
Idemix is designed to minimize linking. Different identities cannot be linked,
actions cannot be linked to identities (because credentials are anonymous), and it
is impossible for two actions to be linked (even if a user presents the same creden-
tial multiple times and even if service providers collude with identity providers).
However, in order to support accountability, a user can voluntarily allow a trusted
party (the identity provider or a third-party) to link the use of a credential to
a pseudonym NIDP or other identifying information by encrypting it under the
trusted party’s secret key and providing this information (along with a proof that
it was correctly generated) when a credential is presented. Since service providers
make authorization decisions, a service provider can choose to authorize only those
users who submit de-anonymizable credentials.
Idemix implements instance-based attribute release; a user must make individ-
ual decisions regarding which attributes are stored with each identity provider and
which attributes are disclosed to which service provider. Idemix credentials do,
however, support selective release of attributes. Credentials can be used to assert
subsets of the attributes or to assert “coarser” versions of the attributes. For ex-
ample, if the credential were issued to assert that N.age = 25 and N.employer =
Example Co. then it could be used assert only that N.age ≥ 18 ; this is imple-
mented by proving that a parameter in the credential is within a range rather equal
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to a specific value. Although Idemix credentials are deniable (since the successful
proof of an attribute or claim requires knowledge of the secret SU), Idemix provides
no mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of attributes against inference.
D.4 Shibboleth (2003, v2.0 released 2006)
Shibboleth is a standards-based, open-source software package developed by Inter-
net2 that implements the SAML standard to provide federated single sign-on and
attribute exchange; it also provides functionality to manage attribute release. The
first version was released in 2003, and Shibboleth 2.0 (which implements SAML 2.0
for its core protocols) was released in 2006. It is deployed primarily in academic
environments; universities function as Shibboleth identity providers, and services
to which they have subscribed (e.g., JSTOR) use the Shibboleth service provider
implementation to control access to protected resources.
Shibboleth implements interactive authentication. When a user attempts to
access a protected resource at a service provider, the service provider first iden-
tifies identity provider(s) with which the user is affiliated. This identification is
done either by interacting directly with the user (e.g., presenting a list of identity
providers and asking the user to select one) or by interacting with a centralized
OASIS discovery service [70]. The service provider then redirects the request to the
appropriate identity provider, and the user authenticates to that identity provider;
the authentication method can either be specified by the service provider or can
be determined by the identity provider. After a successful authentication, the
identity provider sends a signed, encrypted authentication assertion (or a refer-
ence to it) back to the service provider via the user. The service provider verifies
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and unpackages the authentication assertion and uses it to make an authorization
decision.
Whether Shibboleth is vulnerable to linking depends on some user settings.
A user can prevent different identities from being linked (since Shibboleth is a
decentralized system), or the user can choose to store distinct identities with the
same identity provider. Shibboleth supports both pseudonymous and anonymous
authorization (anonymous authorization can be required by any party involved
in the interaction). If anonymous authorization is chosen, then actions cannot
be linked to identities and authorization requests cannot be linked to each other
(although the use of an authentication assertion can be linked to its issuance if the
service provider and identity provider collude).
In comparison to earlier systems, Shibboleth provides sophisticated protection
for attribute confidentiality. A user makes individual, itemized decisions about
which attributes to store with each identity provider, and Shibboleth then supports
expressive policies governing disclosure of these attributes to service providers.
Which attributes are disseminated (that is, which attributes are included in an
authentication assertion) is determined by an attribute filter. An attribute filter
is a collection of policy rules. Each policy rule consists of a single requirement
rule—which determines whether the given policy rule is applied to a particular
authentication request—and zero or more attribute rules—which specify what at-
tributes are affected by the policy rule and whether or not they will be released or
whether release is contingent on explicit, interactive user consent. Policy rules can
depend on requester, issuer, principal, or attribute, and each of these can depend
on exact matches, matching a regular expression, format, attributes of the party
in question, regular expressions for attributes of the party in question, or arbitrary
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scripts. In order to minimize attribute forwarding, an identity provider may make
assertions deniable by sending a reference rather than a signed assertion. However,
no mechanism prevents attribute inference.
D.5 Higgins (2003, v2.0 released 2011)
Begun as an effort by Paul Trevithick to implement a dashboard for managing mul-
tiple distinct identities, Higgins developed into an open-source Information Card
system which simplifies the development and implementation of identity solutions.
Currently, the primary goal of Higgins is to encourage deployment of identity man-
agement systems (and the Higgins Information Card functionality, in particular)
by facilitating installation and by supporting multiple platforms (including mobile
systems). Higgins 1.0 implements the OASIS Identity Management interoperability
protocol and performs the functionality of an identity card selector; it was released
by the Eclipse Foundation in 2008. Higgins 2.0 adds support for a personal data
store.
Higgins is an active-client system in which the user decides what messages are
sent to which parties (currently by running a browser extension and/or native
applications). After establishing an identity with an identity provider, a user re-
ceives an information card associated with that identity. An information card is
a reference to an identity that lists the types of security tokens (e.g., x.509 certifi-
cates, Idemix credentials, etc.) and the types of attributes that can be obtained
from the identity provider. Depending on the Higgins version, information cards
can be stored locally or on a dedicated Higgins server. A user can always be-
come an identity provider by creating personal or self-issued information cards for
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attributes being claimed (e.g., username, address). When a user employs a partic-
ular information card, an authentication assertion corresponding to that identity
is requested from the appropriate identity provider. Identity providers, therefore,
detect user actions, but they cannot necessarily observe the context in which those
actions occur.
Higgins is a decentralized system, so distinct identities established with distinct
identity providers cannot be linked by any single party in the system (other than
the user who established those identities). Whether user actions can be linked to
identities or to other actions depends on the type of authentication assertion that
is employed, something not specified by Higgins.
Confidentiality of attributes is controlled by an instance-based attribute release
mechanism. A user explicitly decides which attributes to share with each identity
provider when establishing a digital identity. Subsequently, during authorization,
the service provider releases a list of requirements (specified either using WS-
SecurityPolicy or HTML) and the user must decide whether to release the requested
attributes and, if so, which identity to use. Once the user selects an identity (or
information card), a request is sent to the corresponding identity provider, and
it issues an authentication assertion for the requested attributes (in the required
format, if specified). Whether and how the release of attributes across invisible
channels is controlled depends on the format of the authentication assertion, which
is not specified by Higgins.
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D.6 PRIME (2004, v3.0 released 2008)
PRIME is the result of the four-year Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
project that ran from 2004 to 2008; the system is a research prototype. The pri-
mary focus of PRIME is enabling users to effectively protect and control personal
information.
PRIME assumes that users will serve as identity providers for self-asserted
attributes; the system includes middleware that users can download and run for
this purpose. Distinct, third-party identity providers—that independently validate
attributes—are intended to issue high-assurance authentication assertions for use
with service providers that do not trust self-asserted attributes.
PRIME is a credential-based identity management system. Prior to issuing
an authorization request, a user interacts with zero or more identity providers
to obtain authentication assertions for various attributes. The details concerning
how a third-party identity provider validates attributes and authenticates users
are not specified. Authentication assertions are implemented as digitally signed
statements or Idemix credentials.
After receiving an authorization request, a service provider responds with a
Data Handling Policy, which describes types of authentication assertions required
for an affirmative authorization decision. The user then describes conditions under
which the user will release various attributes, and PRIME automatically deter-
mines whether there exist attributes, formats, and conditions under which both
parties would satisfied. The conditions could require that released attributes be
tagged with obligations specifying notification requirements, deletion requirements,
and other limitations on attribute use. Any obligations are automatically enforced
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by PRIME.
If an agreement is reached, then the user presents an authentication asser-
tion containing appropriate (tagged) attributes. That assertion also contains a
pseudonym, which can be relationship-based, role-based, role-relationship-based,
or session-based, depending on preferences of the user and the service provider.
Pseudonyms can be arbitrarily assigned strings or can be Idemix pseudonyms.
The degree to which linking is possible depends on the nature of the pseudonym.
D.7 OpenID (2005, v2.0 ratified 2007)
OpenID is an open standard for decentralized identity management that was de-
veloped in 2005; the specification for OpenID 2.0 adds support for attribute man-
agement and was ratified in 2007. OpenID is now provided and accepted by many
websites, including Google, IBM, Yahoo!, AOL, PayPal, VeriSign, MySpace, Live-
Journal, and Steam.
OpenID specifies an interactive authentication protocol. The protocol allows
identity providers to detect (and observe the context of) user actions. Authenti-
cation is initiated when a user requests a protected service from a service provider
and provides an OpenID identifier. Such an identifier is a URL or XRI (e.g.,
username.identityprovider.com). The endpoint for the identity provider asso-
ciated with the given identifier is determined by performing XRI resolution, em-
ploying the Yadis protocol, or by retrieving a document from the specified URL.
The service provider and identity provider then optionally establish a relation (if
there is none) by exchanging secret keys. Next, the service provider redirects
the request to the identity provider with an OpenID authentication request. The
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identity provider authenticates the user and then redirects the request back to the
service provider with a (signed) OpenID assertion. The service provider verifies the
assertion and signature (using the shared secret key or via direct communication
with the identity provider) and then makes an authorization decision.
The OpenID specification describes a decentralized system in which differ-
ent identities associated with the same user cannot be linked. It supports both
pseudonymous and anonymous modes of authorization (which method is employed
is specified by the service provider). When anonymous authorization is employed,
user authorization requests can be linked to a corresponding authentication asser-
tion, but two distinct authorization requests made by the same user cannot be
linked to each other.
OpenID 2.0 [9] introduces support for attributes [29], but protocols to enforce
confidentiality are not specified. Attribute types are given as URIs, and attributes
are arbitrary data encoded as UTF-8 strings. How attributes are created and
which identity providers are given access to those attributes is not described by
the specification, but it is suggested that all parties in the system (including iden-
tity providers and service provides) be allowed to create attributes associated with
a user and to make itemized decisions regarding which identity providers store
those attributes. A service provider can specify requested attribute types (desig-
nated either required or if available); how an identity provider determines which
attributes to release is not covered in the specification, but the Google OpenID
identity provider gives the user the (interactive) option to permit or deny the re-
lease of each attribute on the required list (with an option to remember the selected
permissions for future interactions with that service provider). OpenID attributes
are deniable, but no other mechanisms for preventing or minimizing the release of
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attributes across invisible channels are specified.
D.8 CardSpace (2006)
CardSpace is a proprietary identity management metasystem released by Microsoft
in 2006 as part of the .NET Framework 3.0. It was designed to facilitate man-
agement of multiple digital identities or “identity cards” and is consistent with
the OASIS IMI standard. CardSpace was designed to work with arbitrary token
formats (e.g., OpenID, SAML, U-Prove), but it was compatible only with Internet
Explorer run on Windows operating systems. In 2011, Microsoft announced that
it would not be releasing CardSpace 2.0 and would instead focus its attention on
its new U-Prove system (described in Section D.9).
CardSpace is an active-client system. A user (or a browser acting on behalf of
the user) decides what messages are sent to which parties in the system. Given
the limitations of current web browsers, a user must install the CardSpace client
locally in order to use the identity management system.
Upon establishing an identity with an identity provider, the user is given an
information card. An information card is a locally-stored reference to an identity
that lists the available types of credential, the list of attributes that can be obtained
with that identity, a URL for requesting credentials, a time-stamp, and a globally
unique identifier; information cards are signed by the issuing identity provider.
CardSpace users can also serve as identity providers for self-asserted attributes
(e.g., username).
Since CardSpace is an active-client system, identity providers can detect user
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actions, but they cannot necessarily observe the context in which those actions
occur. The default implementation allows identity providers to observe which
attributes are released at what points in time. However, the identity provider
cannot observe which service provider receives those attributes. CardSpace identity
providers may optionally require a service provider’s identity (information which
is necessary for certain types of credential).
Since CardSpace is an active-client system in which users store information
locally, it must implement means to support users who use multiple devices. To
address this, information cards can be copied onto a portable storage medium.
However, in released versions of CardSpace, the user must download the informa-
tion cards onto the local device prior to use.
CardSpace is a decentralized system. So, distinct identities established with
distinct identity providers cannot necessarily be linked by any single party (other
than the user who established those identities). Whether user actions can be linked
to identities or to other actions depends on the type of credential that is employed
and is not specified by CardSpace.
Confidentiality of attributes is controlled by an instance-based access control
mechanism. A user explicitly decides which attributes to share with each iden-
tity provider when establishing a digital identity. In response to an authorization
request, a service provider releases a list of requirements (specified either using
WS-SecurityPolicy or HTML) and the user must decide whether to release the re-
quested attributes and, if so, which identity to use (the CardSpace system, running
locally on the user’s machine, determines which identities can fulfill the specified
requirements). Once a user selects an identity (or information card), a request is
sent to the corresponding identity provider, and the identity provider issues a cre-
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dential for the requested attributes (in the required format, if specified). Whether
and how the release of attributes across invisible channels is controlled depends on
the type of credential that is used and, therefore, is not specified by CardSpace.
D.9 U-Prove (2007)
U-Prove is an identity management solution based on cryptographic protocols de-
veloped by Stefan Brands [7]. First released by Credentica in 2007, U-Prove was
subsequently acquired and re-branded by Microsoft. It is now available as an
open-source implementation.
U-Prove is a credential-based identity management system where the creden-
tials (called tokens in the U-Prove documentation) consist of digitally signed col-
lections of attributes. More specifically, a U-Prove token consists of a unique
identifier, a public key that encodes the attributes, a token information field that
includes usage restrictions and expiration, the issuing identity provider’s blind sig-
nature of the previous elements, and prover-asserted information (e.g., self-asserted
attributes or a service provider-supplied nonce). In order to obtain a U-Prove token
for a particular identity, a user authenticates with an identity provider and then
participates in the interactive U-Prove issuance protocol, which returns a token
and a private key (known only to the user). A U-Prove token can only be used by
parties that know this private key. If token delegation and transfer are undesirable,
then users can be discouraged from sharing private keys by linking the value to
that of an external secret (e.g., bank account information). Since signatures and,
therefore, tokens can be verified non-interactively, U-Prove is a credential-based
system in which user actions are undetectable to the identity provider.
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U-Prove is a decentralized identity management system. Users can, therefore,
establish distinct identities with distinct identity providers, preventing those iden-
tities from being linked. U-Prove also is an anonymous authorization system, and
user actions cannot be linked to the identity to which a credential was issued.
Because token presentation involves sending the service provider a unique token
identifier, the service provider can link different sessions in which the user was
authorized using the same token. However, uses of two different tokens cannot be
linked. Since U-Prove employs blind signatures to generate tokens, U-Prove tokens
are untraceable (an identity provider cannot link the use of a token to the token
that was issued).
U-Prove provides minimal technical support for confidentiality of user attributes.
A user must make instance-based attribute release decisions to determine which
attributes are disclosed to each identity provider. The mechanism used to con-
trol disclosure of attributes to service providers is not discussed in the U-Prove
documentation. However, in the version integrated into CardSpace, the service
provider requests a collection of attributes whenever a user wants to access a
protected resource. The user responds by sending a U-Prove credential that in-
cludes the requested attributes as well as a zero-knowledge proof that the credential
was generated using those attributes (and possibly other undisclosed attributes)
and a private key known to the user. Observe, this allows release of subsets of
the attributes in a given U-Prove credential. Attributes are deniable (since zero-
knowledge proofs, by definition, cannot be reproduced), but U-Prove provides no
mechanisms to prevent or control attribute inference.
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D.10 P-IMS (2008)
Persona-based Identity Management (P-IMS) is an identity management system
proposed by researchers at Queen’s University in 2008. The primary goal of P-IMS
is to find a balance between anonymity and accountability in a credential-based
system. P-IMS currently exists only on paper.
P-IMS is designed to exploit the features of an identity-based signature scheme.
ID-based signatures allow a party in the system to sign messages in a manner that
permits other parties to verify the signature using only an identifier associated
with the signer; private signing keys are issued to an identifier by a designated
key generator. In the P-IMS system, each identity provider functions as a key
generator, and the cryptographic identifiers are hashes of the (encrypted) list of
attributes associated with an identity. To create an identity (which is called a
persona in the P-IMS documentation), a user gives an identity provider a list of
attributes that the user wishes to associate with that identity; the user may also
optionally present credentials that attest to one or more of the claimed attributes.
The identity provider validates the claimed attributes (a process that could require
real-world interactions and/or verification of the presented credentials) prior to
creating an identity with those attributes.
P-IMS is a credential-based authentication system, so user actions are unde-
tectable to the identity provider. Upon receiving a request, an identity provider
issues a credential for an established identity I (which is a collection of attributes
along with any credentials P presented in support of those attributes) by generating
the private key PKI associated with identifier hash(I) and sending C = (I,PKI) to
the user. To present a credential, a user sends the signed identity (where the signa-
ture is generated using the key PKI) or a signed list of label-encrypted attributes
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(along with labels for the desired attributes) to a service provider. The latter al-
lows the user to selectively disclose attributes from a pre-defined credential, since
label-encrypted ciphertexts require both the private key and a ciphertext-specific
label in order to decrypt the ciphertext. After a credential has been presented,
a service provider can non-interactively verify the credential by verifying the sig-
nature using the appropriate identifier. Non-interactive verification ensures that
authorization requests remain undetectable to the identity provider.
Since P-IMS is envisioned as a decentralized identity management system with
many identity providers, distinct identities associated with the same user may be
stored with distinct identity providers, thereby minimizing the threat of identity
linking. Moreover, P-IMS is an anonymous authorization system; credentials are
not labeled with a name or pseudonym, so actions cannot be inherently linked to
the user behind them. However, all authorization requests that are invoked using
the same credential include the same identity (or label-encrypted list of attributes).
Therefore, a service provider can link two actions that were invoked using the same
credential.
P-IMS provides limited support for attribute confidentiality. Attribute release
to both identity provider and service provider is controlled using an instance-based
approach, although label-encryption does permit a user to release subsets of the
attributes asserted in a credential. No mechanisms prevent or limit communication
of attributes across invisible channels: attributes are not deniable (a credential can
be non-interactively verified by any party), and there is no support for obligations.
There are also no mechanisms designed to prevent or minimize attribute inference.
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D.11 Facebook Single Sign-On (2008, released 2010)
Facebook is commonly considered to be a service provider. However, with the
introduction in 2008 of Facebook Connect—a proprietary single sign-on system—
Facebook became an identity providers as well. Its current identity management
system, Facebook Single Sign-On, is a component of Facebook’s Open Graph plat-
form that implements the OAuth 2.0 [49] authorization specification. By lever-
aging the large Facebook user base and by providing economic incentives for ser-
vice providers (namely access to large quantities of user data, including the social
graph), Facebook Single Sign-On has become one of the most widely-deployed
identity management systems [38].
Facebook Single Sign-On implements an interactive authentication protocol
specified by OAuth 2.0. When a user attempts to access a protected resource,
the service provider presents a login page that includes the option to authenticate
with a Facebook account. When a user selects this option, the browser opens
a Facebook window that asks for authentication credentials (email address and
password) and any requested permissions. Facebook also sets a session cookie at
this time. By default, basic information (which includes name, picture, friends
list, and any information the user has made public) is requested; applications can
also request additional permissions. After a user has authenticated with Facebook
and granted any requested permissions, Facebook issues an access token—a signed
string containing agreed permissions and an expiration date—which is forwarded
to the service provider. The service provider can use the access token to make
requests to Facebook’s APIs, and it can make authorization decisions on the basis
of the received information.
Facebook Single Sign-on is a centralized identity management system: Face-
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book is the sole identity provider. However, linking between multiple identities is
not considered a privacy concern, since the Facebook terms of service limit a user
to a single identity. Facebook Single Sign-On does not prevent linking between
actions and identities or between different actions because it does not support
anonymous authorization. Any service provider that receives an access token can
access the user’s “real-world” name.
Facebook offers little support for confidentiality of user attributes; if a user
wishes to interact with a service provider using Facebook Single Sign-on then that
user must grant the service provider all requested permissions. After permissions
are granted, the service provider can use the resulting access token to make ar-
bitrary calls to the Facebook APIs up until the token expires, and the resulting
information can be used for any purpose.
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